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Competitive Inequality: American 
Banking In The International Arenat 
Marilyn B. Cane* 
David A. Barciay** 
INTRODUCTION 
Twenty-three years ago, six of the ten largest banks in the 
world were U.S. banks. l By the end of 1988, the largest U.S. 
t © Copyright 1990 by Marilyn B. Cane and David A. Barclay. 
* Professor of Law, Nova University Center for the Study of Law; B.A., Cornell Uni-
versity; J.D., Boston College. Professor Cane is a member of the Subcommittee on Bank 
Holding Companies of the Section of Business Law of the American Bar Association. 
** B.B.A., Georgia State University; M.B.A., University of Miami; Candidate for Juris 
Doctor, Nova University Center for the Study of Law, 1990. Mr. Barclay will be associated 
with the firm of Shutts & Bowen in Miami, Florida. 
1 At the end of 1966, the ten largest banks in the world were as follows: 
Table A. 
Bank Deposits* 
1. Bank of America (U.S.) $16.4 
2. Chase Manhattan Bank (U.S.) $13.8 
3. First National Citibank Bank (U.S.) $12.9 
4. Manufacturers Hanover Trust (U.S.) $ 6.8 
5. Barclays Bank (United Kingdom) $ 6.6 
6. Morgan Guaranty Trust (U.S.) $ 6.5 
7. Chemical Bank (U.S.) $ 6.1 
8. Midland Bank (United Kingdom) $ 6.0 
9. Banque Nationale de Paris (France) $ 6.0 
10. Royal Bank of Canada $ 5.8 
*Deposits are in billions of dollars. 
Work, Is Bigger Better in Banking?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORTS, October 12, 1987, 
at 52 [hereinafter Is Bigger Better?]. 
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bank was only the twenty-seventh largest bank in the world. 2 Why 
have V.S. banks lost so much ground in international banking 
markets in such a short period of time? 
One reason that explains the V.S. banks' loss of stature is 
undoubtedly traceable to the relatively burdensome regulations 
under which they must operate. As Justice Roberts stated fifty-
seven years ago, "[A] regulation valid for one sort of business, or 
in given circumstances, may be invalid for another sort, or for 
the same business under other circumstances, because the rea-
sonableness of each regulation depends upon the relevant facts."3 
The wisdom of Justice Roberts' statement rings true today more 
than ever upon consideration of the reasonableness of regulations 
that govern V.S. banks competing in international markets. While 
the regulations governing V.S. banks' domestic branches arguably 
make sense, virtually identical regulations governing branches 
operating abroad may serve no useful purpose. Such regulations 
prevent these banks from competing on equal terms in interna-
tional banking markets. 
The wide variety of foreign regulations that V.S. banks face 
abroad also helps explain their relative decline. Not only must 
2 By the end of 1988, the largest banks in the world were as follows: 
Table B. 
Bank 
1. Dai-ichi Kangyo Bank (Japan) 
2. Sumitomo Bank (Japan) 
3. Fuji Bank (Japan) 
4. Mitsubishi Bank (Japan) 
5. Sanwa Bank (Japan) 
6. Industrial Bank of Japan (Japan) 
7. Norinchukin Bank (Japan) 
8. Mitsubishi Trust & Banking Co. (Japan) 
9. Sumitomo Trust & Banking Co. (Japan) 












Citibank, the largest United States bank, has $105.0 billion in deposits, but it is only the 
twenty-seventh largest bank in the world. 
*Deposits in billions of dollars. 
The Top 500 Banks in the World, AM. BANKER, July 24, 1989, at 26. 
3 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1933). 
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U.S. banks struggle to simultaneously comply with the regulations 
of several host countries, such regulations may preclude U.S. 
bank branches from providing the same services as host country 
banks. Admittedly, however, the problem of inconsistent and pro-
tectionist regulation affects all international banking and not just 
U.S. banks. 
This Article explores the extent U.S. and foreign regulations 
hinder the competitiveness of U.S. banks in the global market-
place. Part I of this Article reviews U.S. regulation of foreign 
branches of U.S. banks in the areas of the creation of foreign 
branches, capital adequacy, liquidity control, foreign branch lend-
ing, foreign exchange risk, permissible business activities, exam-
ination and disclosure requirements, liquidity support, and de-
posit insurance. Parts II through IV review the regulation of U.S. 
branches by Japan, the United Kingdom, and the Federal Re-
public of Germany. An appendix to these parts also compares 
the various regulations U.S. banks face in each of these countries 
in chart form. Part V considers the formidable impediments U.S. 
regulations pose to U.S. banks' foreign branches and focuses, in 
particular, on the Glass-Steagall Act. Part VI considers multilat-
eral attempts to coordinate international banking regulation. This 
Article concludes that multilateral harmonization of international 
banking regulation would allow U.S. banks to compete more 
effectively abroad. This Article further concludes that unilateral 
repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act would go far towards allowing 
U.S. banks to regain their former preeminent position in the 
international banking community. 
I. U.S. REGULATION OF FOREIGN BRANCHES 
A. Overview of the U.S. Banking System 
The U.S. banking system is largely a result of political and 
economic events which have occurred throughout the country's 
history. Politically, dissension between Federalist and anti-Feder-
alist factions eventually led to bank chartering authority at both 
the state and federallevels. 4 This dual banking system results in 
4 See E. SYMONS & J. WHITE, BANKING LAW 11-21 (1984) (discussing the political ma-
neuvering between Federalists and anti-Federalists concerning the chartering of the First 
Bank of the United States in 1791 and the Second Bank of the United States in 1816). 
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significant confusion that is only compounded by the multiple 
regulatory authorities it has spawned.5 
There are four primary bank regulatory authorities in the 
United States: the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC), the Federal Reserve Board (FRB), the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the pertinent state banking 
authority. National banks are both chartered and regulated by 
the OCC.6 Moreover, by virtue of their status, national banks are 
statutorily required to be members of the Federal Reserve System 
(FRS) and to possess FDIC deposit insurance.7 Consequently, 
national banks are also subject to regulation by the FRB and 
FDIC. 
Unlike national banks, state-chartered banks have some leeway 
in deciding their regulatory fate. A state-chartered bank is always 
subject to regulation by that state's banking authority.8 Beyond 
this point, however, a bank is relatively free to decide who will 
exercise regulatory authority over it. 9 A bank may choose to 
become a member of the FRS, in which case it will be deemed a 
"member" bank. 1O A bank selecting this option must carry FDIC 
deposit insurance. Accordingly, the FRB, the FDIC, and the state 
banking authority will exercise regulatory authority over the bank 
simultaneously. I I 
Despite the prestige afforded a "member" bank, many state-
chartered banks choose not to join the FRS and instead apply 
independently for FDIC deposit insurance. 12 If the FDIC ap-
proves the bank's application, the state banking regulator will 
5 This paper discusses only bank regulators. Banks, however, are subject to other laws 
and regulations including antitrust laws (Le. section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Sherman 
Antitrust Act), enforced by the Justice Department, and the securities laws, enforced by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Commodities Futures Trading Commission, 
the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, and the National Association of Securities 
Dealers, among others. 15 V.S.C.A. §§ 1-7, 18 (West 1989); see Isaac & Fein, Facing the 
Future-Life Without Glass-Steagall, 37 CATH. V.L. REV. 281, 313-14 (1988). 
While the regulatory structure for depository institutions has undergone significant 
changes as a result of The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act 
of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183, reprinted in Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH 
Special) No. 1298 (August 18, 1989), the basic structure discussed in this paper has 
remained intact. 
6 Friesen, The Regulation and Supervision of International Lending (pt. 1), 19 INT'L LAW. 
1059, 1069 (1985). 
7Id. 
SId. 
9 This would be subject to customer demand for such features as deposit insurance. 
10 Friesen, supra note 6, at 1070. 
II Id. 
12 Id. at 1069. 
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exercise concurrent regulatory authority with the FDIC over the 
state-chartered bank. 13 The following chart illustrates the levels 
of regulation that U. S. banks face: 
Table I. 
Bank Type Chartering Authority Regulatory Authority(s) 
National Bank OCC OCC, FRB, FDIC 
State Member State State, FRB, FDIC 
Bank 
State Nonmember State State, FDIC 
Insured Bank 
State Nonmember State State 
Noninsured Bank 
In addition to political powerplays, congressional responses to 
economic events have played a major role in shaping today's 
banking system. 14 Reacting to the 1929 stock market crash and 
the ensuing Great Depression, Congress passed the Banking Act 
of 1933. 15 This legislation had two particularly important fea-
tures. First, it provided for a statutory deposit insurance scheme 
by creating the FDIC.16 This was seen as an important step in 
restoring confidence in the United States' depression-ravaged 
banking systemP Second, and more important in shaping the 
structure of today's banking system, Congress separated com-
mercial banking and investment banking via the 1933 Act's Glass-
Steagall provisions. IS While the Glass-Steagall Act provided a 
remedy to cure the banking abuses of the 1920s, there are serious 
questions concerning its continuing vitality in today's banking 
I!Id. 
14 R. DALE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING 129 (1986). 
15 The Banking Act of 1933 is also referred to as the Glass-Steagall Act, being named 
after its sponsors. See Issac & Fein, supra note 5, at 281 n.l 
16 See 12 V.S.C. §§ 1811-1832 (1989). 
17 See F.D. Roosevelt, Radio Address Delivered From the President's Study, March 12, 
1933, reprinted in E. SYMONS & J. WHITE, supra note 4, at 37-40. 
18 Sections of the Glass-Steagall Act which effectively separate commercial banking from 
investment banking are codified at 12 V.S.C.A. §§ 24(7) (forbidding banks from under-
writing corporate securities), 78 (persons affiliated with investment banks may not serve 
as officers, directors, or employees of member banks), 377 (member banks may not be 
affiliated with securities firms), 378 (member banks may not deal in securities) (West 
1989). See, e.g., Garten, Regulatory Growing Pains: A Perspective on Bank Regulation in a 
Deregulatory Age, 57 FORDHAM L. REv. 501 (1989); Symons, The "Business of Banking" in 
Historical Perspective, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 676 (1983) (both articles discussing the 
evolution of the foregoing provisions). 
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environment. 19 These questions, as they relate to international 
banking regulation, are addressed later in this paper.20 
Two other statutes which helped forge the banking system's 
structure merit brief discussion. The Bank Holding Company 
Act of 1956 restricted a bank holding company's activities to those 
which were closely related to banking.21 One intended effect of 
this legislation was to insure that bank holding companies did not 
own domestic investment banking subsidiaries and thereby di-
minish the Glass-Steagall Act's effect. 22 
The McFadden Act of 1927 allowed national banks to branch 
for the first time.23 Amendments to the McFadden Act permitted 
national banks to branch to the same extent as state-chartered 
banks.24 Unfortunately, restrictive state branching laws caused the 
U.S. banking system to evolve into a complex web of more than 
14,000 banks.25 With this historical perspective in mind, the logic 
(or illogic) of U.S. regulation of foreign branches is more easily 
understood. 
B. Creating a Foreign Branch 
Member banks of the FRS with more than $1,000,000 in capital 
and surplus may file an application with the Board of Governors 
of the FRS for permission to establish a foreign branch. 26 The 
19 See, e.g., Cane, Non-Broker Brokers and Other Anomolies in the Regulation of Financial 
Services, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 111 (1988); Ferrara & Buttarazzi, Set Them Free: 
Glass-Steagall Restrictions Make U.S. Banks Less Competitive, L.A. Daily J., May 18, 1988, at 
4, col. 3. 
20 See infra notes 314-320 and accompanying text. 
2112 U.S.C.A. §§ 1841-1850 (West 1989). 
22Id. at § 1843. Section 1843 specifies what non-bank subsidiaries a bank holding 
company may own and which investment banking affiliates are not included in that list. 
Id. Nevertheless, on January 18, 1989, the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) conditionally 
approved applications made by Bankers Trust New York Corporation; the Chase Man-
hattan Corporation; Citicorp; J.P. Morgan & Co., Inc.; and Security Pacific Corporation 
allowing subsidiaries of each bank holding company to engage in the underwriting and 
dealing of securities. J.P. Morgan & Co., Incorporated, The Chase Manhattan Corporation, 
Bankers Trust New York Corporation, Citicorp, and Security Pacific Corporation, 75 Fed. Res. 
Bull. 192 (1989) [hereinafter January 18th Approval]. Another effect of the Bank Holding 
Company Act of 1956 was to prohibit bank holding companies from avoiding interstate 
branching laws established by the McFadden Act. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1842(d) creates this 
prohibition by including virtually the same language as is contained in the McFadden Act 
at 12 U.S.C.A. § 36. (West 1989). 
23 12 U.S.C.A. § 36 (West 1989). 
241d. at § 36(c). 
25 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 129. 
26 12 U.S.C.A. § 601 (West 1989) (referring only to national banking associations); 12 
U.S.C.A. § 321 (West 1989) (causing § 601 to be applied to state-chartered member 
1990] INTERNATIONAL BANKING 279 
application must state the bank's name and capital position, the 
powers the bank is applying for, and theplace(s) where operations 
will be conducted.27 The Board of Governors may reject any 
application it deems improper and may also increase or decrease 
the places where foreign branches can conduct business.28 If the 
bank is a national banking association, it must file an application 
with the OCC along with its application to the Board of Gover-
nors.29 
Once a member bank establishes a foreign branch in one coun-
try, it may establish additional branches in that country without 
notifying the FRB of its intent to do SO.30 If the member bank 
operates branches in at least two foreign countries, it may estab-
lish branches in other foreign countries simply by giving the FRB 
forty-five days notice in advance.31 
A state nonmember insured bank may establish foreign 
branches, but such activity is subject to regulations prescribed by 
the FDIC.32 Before the state nonmember insured bank may es-
tablish a foreign branch, it must apply for and obtain the FDIC's 
prior written consent.33 The bank will generally obtain the FDIC's 
consent but not before fulfilling certain requirements. The bank 
must file the application with the appropriate FDIC regional 
director not more than thirty days before opening the branch.34 
Additionally, such application must state the branch's exact lo-
cation, any insider involvement, the name and address of the 
newspaper in which notice of the bank's intent to branch will be 
published, and the date when that notice will be published.35 The 
banks); 12 C.F.R. § 211.2(h) (1989) (defining foreign branch as "an office of an organi-
zation (other than a representative office) that is located outside the country under the 
laws of which the organization is established, at which banking or financing business is 
conducted"). 
27 12 V.S.C.A. § 601 (West 1989). 
28 [d. 
29 12 C.F.R. § 20.3(a)(I) (1989). The comptroller provides the requisite forms for filing 
a foreign branch application. 12 C.F.R. § 20.3(b) (1989). 
30 12 C.F.R. § 211.3(a)(2) (1989). 
31 12 C.F.R. § 211.3(a)(3) (1989). Prior authority to establish foreign branches expires 
one year from the earliest date on which the authority could have been exercised unless 
the FRB expressly extends the period. 12 C.F.R. § 211.3(a)(4) (1989). Any bank which 
opens, closes, or relocates a foreign branch must report the change to the FRB. 12 C.F.R. 
§ 211.3(a)(5) (1989). 
32 12 V.S.C.A. § 1828(d)(2) (West 1989). 
33 12 C.F.R. § 347.3(a) (1989). 
34 [d. 
35 [d. Section 303.2(a)(2) defines insider involvement as any involvement by "a director, 
an officer, or a shareholder who directly or indirectly controls 5 or more percent of any 
class of [the bank's] voting stock .... " [d. at § 303.2(a)(2). 
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bank must repeat this procedure each time it wishes to open 
another foreign branch. 
C. Capital Adequacy 
A bank's capital adequacy is monitored regularly as part of the 
bank examination process in the United States.36 An initial capital 
requirement for establishing a foreign branch is that the bank, 
as a consolidated entity, possess $1,000,000 in capital and sur-
plus.37 Similarly, ongoing capital adequacy is measured on a con-
solidated basis rather than with respect to an individual branch.38 
Therefore, a foreign branch's individual capital position is of 
nominal importance to U.S. regulators so long as the bank's con-
solidated capital position is adequate.39 Nevertheless, U.S. regu-
lators' capital adequacy requirements merit brief discussion so 
the reader can better understand the differences among various 
countries' regulatory approaches concerning the measurement of 
capital. 
U.S. regulators rate a bank's capital position in relation to its 
assets. Regulations require banks to maintain primary capital 
equal to at least 5.5% of total adjusted assets.40 Total capital, 
36 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 130-3l. 
37 See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
38 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 13l. 
39 [d. Regulators, however, do consider the fact that foreign branches may engage in 
riskier activities than domestic branches when evaluating a bank's capital position and 
are, thus, more apt to closely scrutinize the foreign branches' individual financial position. 
[d. 
40 Capital adequacy guidelines are set forth in 12 C.F.R. § 3.6 (Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency), § 255 App. A (Federal Reserve Board), § 325.3(b) (1989) (Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation). The guidelines between the agencies are extremely 
similar but not uniform. In computing capital adequacy, the Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency (OCC) defines the following terms as: '''Adjusted Total Assets' means the 
average total assets figure required to be computed for and stated in a bank's most recent 
quarterly ... (Call report), plus the end-of-quarter allowance for loan and lease losses, 
minus end-of-quarter intangible assets not included in primary capital .... " 12 C.F.R. 
§ 3.2(a) (1989). "Primary Capital" means the sum of [the following]: 
(1) Common stock, perpetual preferred stock, capital surplus, undivided prof-
its, reserves for contingencies and other capital reserves (excluding accrued 
dividends on perpetual and limited life preferred stock), net worth certificates 
issued pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1823; 
(i) Minority interests in consolidated subsidiaries, and allowances for loan and 
lease losses; minus intangible assets; 
(2) Purchased mortgage servicing rights; and 
(3) Mandatory convertible debt to the extent of 20% of the sum of [paragraphs 
(1) and (2) above]. 
12 C.F.R. § 3.2(c) (1989). 
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consisting of secondary capital and primary capital, must equal 
6% of total adjusted assets.41 
In determining a bank's capital adequacy, however, regulators 
also consider more subjective criteria such as its growth history, 
its plans for future growth, and its management strength.42 Fi-
nally, regulators analyze recent earning trends and dividend pay-
out ratios to determine whether and to what extent retained 
earnings will contribute to future capital growth.43 
D. Liquidity Control 
The acc, FRB, and FDIC evaluate a bank's liquidity position 
as a normal part of the U.S. bank examination process.44 Regu-
lators, however, do not impose standard ratios regulating a bank's 
liquidity position.45 Rather, the regulators view a bank's individual 
liquidity position with respect to several factors, including deposit 
volatility, ability to convert assets into cash, management exper-
tise, reliance on interest-sensitive funds, and access to money 
markets.46 
As with capital adequacy, U.S. regulators generally consider a 
bank's liquidity position on a consolidated basis.4' If, however, a 
U.S. bank has a large foreign branch with prior liquidity prob-
lems, that branch's operations may be analyzed separately.48 
E. Foreign Branch Lending Activities 
Two regulatory issues confront U.S. banks concerning a for-
eign branch's lending activities-lending limits and country risk 
exposure. Lending by foreign branches is generally subject to the 
same restrictions imposed on domestic branches.49 Therefore, a 
41 The OCC defines secondary capital as: 
"Secondary capital" means the sum of paragraphs (d)(l) and (2) of this section, 
to the extent that this figure does not exceed 50% of the bank's primary capital: 
(I) mandatory convertible debt that is not included in primary capital; and (2) 
limited life preferred stock and subordinated notes and debentures. 
12 C.F.R. § 3.2(d) (1989). 
42 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 131. 
43Id. 
44 Friesen, supra note 6, at 1078. 
45Id. 
46 Id.; see The Comptroller's Manual for National Bank Examiners at §§ 203, 301, 405, 503, 
600 (1989). 
47 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 132. 
48 !d. 
49 Corse & Nichols, United States Regulation of International Lending by American Banks, in 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL LAW 155 (Euromoney pubs. 1988). 
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foreign branch may not make a loan to a single borrower which 
exceeds 15% of its parent bank's unimpaired capital and surplus 
unless a statutory exception applies. 50 Additionally, because all 
loans to a single borrower are aggregated for lending limit pur-
poses, the foreign branch must stay apprised of loans the bank 
has made at other branches to the same borrower so as to not 
violate lending limits.5' 
Furthermore, a U.S. bank must file a Country Exposure Report 
(CER) if its foreign branch has consolidated claims against foreign 
residents of any country exceeding $20,000,000.52 Authorities 
developed the CER as part of an increasing awareness of country 
risk, precipitated in large part by mounting loan losses in par-
ticular countries. 53 A bank must file a CER with its primary 
U.S. regulator within forty-five days of each quarter's end.54 
The CER must include information on loans, securities, and 
other assets which operate to give a bank a claim against foreign 
residen ts. 55 
F. Foreign Exchange Risk 
U.S. regulators do not set specific limits on a bank's foreign 
exchange activities.56 Instead, regulators monitor a bank's foreign 
exchange exposure by analyzing periodic reports submitted by 
the bank.57 For instance, the acc requires that national banking 
associations file a consolidated report of foreign exchange activ-
ities for any month in which specified foreign exchange transac-
tions exceed $100,000,000. 58 A specified foreign exchange trans-
action consists of a trade involving Canadian dollars, French 
francs, German marks, Japanese yen, Swiss francs, or British 
pounds. 59 
50 See 12 U.S.C.A. § 84 (West 1989). 12 U.S.C.A. § 324 applies § 84 lending limits to 
banks which are members of the Federal Reserve System. 
5l Corse & Nichols, supra note 49, at 159. 




56 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 132. 
57 [d. 
58 12 C.F.R. § 20.5(a), (c) (1989). 
59 12 C.F.R. § 20.5(b) (1989). 
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G. Permissible Business Activities 
Federal law empowers the Board of Governors of the FRB to 
issue regulations authorizing a member bank's foreign branch "to 
exercise such ... powers as may be usual in connection with the 
transaction of the business of banking in the places where [the] 
foreign branch transact[s] business."6o These regulations, how-
ever, may not go so far as to authorize a foreign branch to 
produce, distribute, buy, or sell general merchandise.61 Likewise, 
the FRB may not "authorize a foreign branch to engage or par-
ticipate, directly or indirectly, in the business of underwriting, 
selling, or distributing securities."62 
Consistent with its statutory authority, the FRB promulgated 
Regulation K63 which prescribes the powers a member bank's 
foreign branch may exercise beyond general banking powers. 
Currently, a foreign branch may engage in the following activities, 
if it is a usual activity in the host country's banking industry: 
(1) The foreign branch may guarantee a debt or otherwise 
agree to make payments on the happening of a readily as-
certainable event.64 The foreign bank's guarantee or agree-
ment must specify a maximum monetary liability. However, 
to the extent the guarantee or agreement is not fully secured, 
its maximum dollar amount may not exceed the lending 
limits prescribed in 12 u.s.c. § 84.65 
(2) The foreign branch may invest in: 
(i) Securities of the central bank, clearing houses, govern-
mental entities, and government-sponsored development 
banks of the foreign branch's host country; 
(ii) Other debt securities which the host country determines 
are eligible to meet local reserve requirements; and 
(iii) Shares in organizations like professional societies and 
schools which are necessary to the branch's business. 
60 12 V.S.C.A. § 604a (West 1989). 
61 [d. This is an attempt to restrict banks to "the business of banking" as contemplated 
by 12 V.S.C.A. § 24 (West 1989). 
62 12 V.S.C.A. § 604a (West 1989). 
63 Regulation K is contained in 12 C.F.R. Part 211 (1989). The OCC did not promulgate 
a similar section; rather, it chose to rely on the fact that all national banks are members 
of the Federal Reserve and, as such, are regulated by the rules contained in Regulation 
K. 
64 12 C.F.R. § 211.3(b)(I) n.3 (1989). Section 211.3(b)(I) n.3 states: "'[r]eadily ascertain-
able events' include, but are not limited to, events such as non-payment of taxes, rentals, 
customs duties, or costs of transport and loss or nonconformance of shipping documents." 
[d. 
65 Generally, the lending limit is 15% of a bank's unimpaired capital and surplus. See 
12 V.S.C.A. § 84 (West 1989). 
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The total investments of the bank's branches in the country (ex-
cluding securities held pursuant to 12 U .S.C. § 24(7»,66 however, 
may not exceed 1 % of the branch's total deposits in that country 
on the preceding year end call report date. 67 
(3) The foreign branch may underwrite, distribute, buy, and 
sell obligations of: 
(i) The host country's national government; 
(ii) An agency or instrumentality of the host country's na-
tional government; or 
(iii) A municipal, local, or regional governmental entity. 
The bank, however, may not hold or be under commitment to 
hold any of the foregoing obligations for its own account if the 
total holdings exceed 10% of the bank's capital and surplus.68 
(4) The foreign branch may loan a bank officer residing in 
the foreign branch's country of operations funds to acquire 
or build a house which the officer will use as his residence 
while living abroad. The loan must be promptly reported to 
the foreign branch's home office. If the loan exceeds 
$100,000, it must also be promptly reported to the parent 
bank's board of directors. 
(5) The foreign branch may take liens or encumbrances on 
foreign real estate as security for loans. The liens or en-
cumbrances do not have to be senior, and the real estate may 
be unimproved.69 
(6) The foreign branch may act as an insurance agent or 
broker. 
(7) The foreign branch may, as part of an employee benefit 
plan, pay an employee a higher rate of interest than other 
depositors receive. 
(8) The foreign branch may enter repurchase agreements70 
involving securities and commodities if the repurchase agree-
ment is functionally equivalent to extending credit. 
(9) The foreign branch may establish or invest in wholly 
owned subsidiaries which engage in permissible member 
66 Securities which banks may hold pursuant to 12 U.S.C.A. § 24 (West 1989) are 
generally government securities. 
67 If the branch, however, was recently acquired from a foreign institution and had no 
year-end call report, securities held may not exceed I % of the total deposits as of the 
acquisition date. 12 C.F.R. § 211.3(b)(2) (1989). 
68 Cf 12 U .S.C.A. § 24(7) (West 1989) (10% limit on certain types of investment securities 
a bank may hold in its portfolio). 
69 The foreign branch's real estate activities are not subject to the real estate loan 
provisions contained in 12 U .S.C.A. § 371 (West 1989). 
70 A repurchase agreement is a contract wherein money is loaned to borrowers who 
provide high-grade securities as collateral for the loan. See E. SYMONS & J. WHITE, supra 
note 4, at 210. 
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bank activities, or activities incidental to the banking business 
in the host country. The FRB must grant prior approval 
before the foreign branch engages in these activities. 
(10) The foreign branch may engage in other activities which 
are usual to the banking business in the host country, but 
only with prior approval from the Federal Reserve Board.7I 
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Similarly, the FDIC has the power to prescribe regulations 
concerning those activities in which foreign branches of state 
nonmember insured banks may engage.72 The regulations pro-
mulgated by the FDIC are generally congruent with the FRB's 
Regulation K and permit foreign branches of state nonmember 
insured banks to engage in activities common to the banking 
business in the host country.73 
H. Bank Examination and Disclosure Requirements 
Bank examinations are the cornerstone of the regulatory pro-
cess in the United States. 74 Depending on the parent bank's pri-
mary regulatory authority, examiners from the acc, FRB, or 
71 12 C.F.R. § 211.3(b) (1989). While foreign branches are prohibited from participating 
in investment banking activities, subsidiaries of a bank holding company may engage in: 
[U]nderwriting, distributing, and dealing in debt and equity securities outside 
the United States, provided that no underwriting commitment by a subsidiary 
of [a bank holding company] for shares of an issuer may exceed $2 million or 
represent 20% of the capital and surplus or voting shares of an issuer unless the 
underwriter is covered by binding commitments from subunderwriters or other 
purchasers .... 
12 C.F.R. § 211.5(d)(3) (1989). Thus, subject to certain conditions, subsidiaries of U.S. 
bank holding companies can engage in a broad spectrum of investment banking activities 
outside the United States. See January 18th Approval, supra note 22 at 192; Weberman, 
More Freedom, Fatter Profits, Forbes, July 14, 1986, at 35-36. Currently, U.S. banks "main-
tain securities affiliates in London, Tokyo and other international financial centers and 
were among the leading underwriters of Eurosecurities in 1986 and 1987." January 18th 
Approval, supra note 22, at 198. 
Nevertheless, despite their underwriting success of Eurosecurities, investment banking 
subsidiaries of U.S. bank holding companies remain smaller and less well-capitalized than 
their foreign branch siblings. See J. HOUPT, INTERNATIONAL TRENDS FOR U.S. BANKS AND 
BANKING MARKETS 3 (1988) (Staff Economic Study for Federal Reserve Board). Accord-
ingly, this Article takes the position that foreign branches of U.S. banks should be able 
to engage in any activities in which banks organized under the laws of the host country 
are allowed to engage in, including, but not limited to, the underwriting of securities. 
7212 U.S.C.A. § 1828(d) (West 1989). 
73 See 12 C.F.R. § 347.3(c) (1989). The 12 U.S.C.A. § 604a (West 1989) prohibition 
against a bank selling goods and engaging in certain securities activities is contained in 
12 C.F.R. § 347.3(d) (1989). The primary distinction between Regulation K and the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's (FDIC) regulations is that pursuant to 12 C.F.R. 
§ 347.3(c)(I) (1989), it may also be necessary for the FDIC to consider state law to 
determine whether the foreign branch's desired activity is permissible. 
74 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 133. 
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FDIC may regularly conduct examinations of foreign branches.75 
The examination process focuses on the following five distinct 
areas: capital adequacy, asset quality, management quality, earn-
ings and profitability, and liquidity.76 Foreign branches must con-
form to the reporting and disclosure requirements which rein-
force the on-site examination process. 
National banking associations and member banks are required 
to furnish information concerning the condition of their foreign 
branches to the acc and FRB on demand. 77 While specific re-
porting requirements have not been established, the foreign 
branch must have systems in place which provide detailed infor-
mation concerning the branch's risk assets, liquidity, and man-
agement so as to insure that the "high standards of banking and 
financial prudence" inherent in the U.S. banking system are 
maintained. 78 Furthermore, foreign branch operations are seg-
regated from the home office with each foreign branch's profit 
or loss for a fiscal year calculated separately and transferred to 
the parent bank's books only at the end of the period. 79 
FDIC reporting requirements for foreign branches are more 
detailed. The parent bank is required to submit an annual report 
on each foreign branch's condition to the FDIC.80 At a minimum, 
the report must contain detailed information of the foreign 
branch's risk assets, liquidity, contingencies, and internal control 
systems.8l Furthermore, the FDIC may at any time require the 
parent to provide special reports containing additional informa-
tion.82 
I. Liquidity Support 
The FRS provides liquidity support to depository institutions 
by discounting eligible paper and making advances secured by 
75 Id.; see 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 602, 1828(d) (West 1989). Regulatory authority for examina-
tions is contained in 12 C.F.R. §§ 20.1(b)(3) (OCC), 211.7(b)(1), (3) (FRB), 347.6 (1989) 
(FDIC). 
76 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 133. The acronym for these five areas is "CAMEL". See 
Norton, Capital Adequacy Standards: A Legitimate Regulatory Concern for Prudential Supervision 
of Banking Activities?, 49 OHIO ST. J.L. 1299, 1316-21 (1989) (discussing the development 
of the Uniform Interagency Bank Rating System from which the term "CAMEL" emerged). 
77 12 U.S.C.A. § 602 (West 1989). 
78 12 C.F.R. § 211.7(a) (1989); see also 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(a) (1989). 
79 12 U.S.C.A. § 604 (West 1989). 
80 12 C.F.R. § 347.6(b) (1989). 
81 12 C.F.R. § 347.6(a)(1)-(4) (1989). 
82 12 C.F.R. § 347.6(c) (1989). 
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satisfactory collateral. 83 This service goes directly to the parent 
bank of a foreign branch.84 The parent bank may, in turn, pro-
vide liquidity assistance to its foreign branch by diverting the 
credit it receives from the FRS to its foreign branch.85 
Reserve requirements, however, are the quid pro quo for the 
FRS's liquidity assistance.86 Uniform reserves are required on all 
transaction accounts and time deposits held by depository insti-
tutions.87 Consequently, all foreign branches must maintain re-
serves on transaction accounts and time deposits equal to those 
held by domestic branches unless the funds are payable only 
outside of the United States88 or the FRB otherwise promulgates 
regulations exempting them.89 
Currently, the following foreign branch deposits are subject to 
reserve requirements: 9o 
l. A deposit of a U.S. resident91 of less than $100,000, regard-
less of where the depositor may demand payment; 
83 Friesen, supra note 6, at 1082. The Federal Reserve's services can be used by all 
depository institutions pursuant to the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary 
Control Act. 12 U.S.C.A. § 461(b)(2), (7) (West 1989). 
84 Friesen, supra note 6, at 1082. 
85Id. 
86 The FRB requires banks to hold a certain percentage of their total deposits in the 
form of cash reserves and, thus, the term reserve requirements. See E. SYMONS & J. 
WHITE, supra note 4, at 50. 
87 12 U.S.C.A. § 461(b)(2)(D) (West 1989). Section 461(b)(5) indicates reserve require-
ments apply to foreign branches of both member and non-member banks. !d. at 
§ 461(b)(5). 
8812 U.S.C.A. § 461 (b)(6) (West 1989); 12 C.F.R. § 204.I(c)(5) (1989). Deposits payable 
only outside the United States are defined as: 
(I) a deposit of a United States resident that is in a denomination of $100,000 
or more, and as to which the depositor is entitled, under the agreement with the 
institution, to demand payment only outside the United States or (2) a deposit 
of a person who is not a United States resident as to which the depositor is 
entitled, under the agreement with the institution, to demand payment only 
outside the United States. 
12 C.F.R. § 204.2(t) (1989). 
89 The FRB has exercised its statutory authority and promulgated regulations concern-
ing reserve requirements in 12 C.F.R. Part 204 (1989) (commonly referred to as Regu-
lation D). 
90 Rules regarding the mechanics of computing reserve requirements are contained in 
12 C.F.R. § 204.9 (1989). 
91 "U.S. resident" is defined as: 
(I) any individual residing (at the time of the transaction) in the United States; 
(2) any corporation, partnership, association or other entity organized in the 
United States ("domestic corporation"); and (3) any branch or office located in 
the United States of any entity that is not organized in the United States. 
12 C.F.R. § 204.2(s) (1989). 
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2. A deposit of a U.S. resident in an amount greater than 
$100,000 if the depositor may demand payment in the United 
States; 
3. A deposit of a non-U.S. resident of any denomination if the 
depositor may demand payment in the United States.92 Further-
more, Eurocurrency liabilities are also subject to uniform reserve 
requirements.93 
J. Deposit Insurance 
The FDIC provides deposit insurance to all national banking 
associations and member banks and to state chartered nonmem-
ber banks which qualify for coverage. In a typical liquidity crisis, 
the FDIC would not be involved.94 In the event a bank becomes 
insolvent, however, the FDIC will take action to protect deposi-
tors.95 Presently, foreign branch deposits are not included in 
assessing a bank's deposit insurance premium.96 Consequently, 
foreign branch deposits are not insured and do not receive pro-
tection in the event of bank failure. 97 
This Article now turns to analagous bank regulations in Japan, 
the United Kingdom, and West Germany. From this point for-
ward, a foreign country's bank regulations are considered appli-
cable to a foreign branch of a U.S. bank unless otherwise noted. 
92 12 C.F.R. § 204.2(t) (1989). 
93 See 12 C.F.R. § 204.2(h) (1989) (providing an exhaustive definition of the term 
"Eurocurrency liabilities"). 
94 Friesen, supra note 6, at 1082. 
95 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 153. There are two types of FDIC protection: (I) statutory 
insurance coverage per deposit of $100,000; and (2) protection for uninsured deposits 
which arises from the FDIC's preferred method of dealing with failed banks wherein it 
purchases and assumes their operations. Id. 
96 12 U.S.C.A. § 1817(b)(5) (West 1989). 
97 12 U.S.C.A. § 1813(m)(I) (West 1989). The deposits may not receive de jure protection, 
but the FDIC guaranteed foreign deposits in the amount of $16,600,000,000 when it 
bailed out Continental Illinois National Bank in 1983-84. See Sprague, The FDIC After 
Fifty-Two Years: Time for a Tune-Up, 5 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 141, 143-46 (1986). As a 
related matter, the U.S. Supreme Court should soon be definitely resolving whether a 
foreign branch depositor may demand repayment of the deposit at the bank's home office 
when the foreign branch is unable to repay its depositors by virtue of adverse economic 
or credit factors. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., 852 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1988), 
cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 537 (1989); see also Trinh v. Citibank, N.A., 850 F.2d 1164 (6th 
Cir. 1988), petition for cert. filed, 57 U .S.L.w. 3455 (jan. 10, 1989). For a complete discussion 
of laws affecting international bank deposits, see Smedersman & Lowenfield, Eurodollars, 
Multinational Banks, and National Laws, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733 (1989). 
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II. JAPAN-REGULATION OF FOREIGN BRANCHES 
A. Overview of the japanese Banking System 
The Banking Law of 1927 (Banking Law), as amended in 1981, 
provides a regulatory framework for the Japanese banking sys-
tem.98 Two bank regulatory authorities anchor this framework-
the Bank of Japan (BOJ) and the Ministry of Finance (MOF). 
The BOJ is statutorily responsible for implementing monetary 
policy in the Japanese financial markets.99 The BOJ accomplishes 
this primarily by influencing banks who borrow from its discount 
window. lOo Whatever regulatory authority the BOJ possesses, it 
derives this authority from contract, not from statute. 101 Pursuant 
to contracts entered into with client banks, the BOJ conducts 
biennial examinations of these banks to insure the safety and 
soundness of the Japanese banking system. 102 
Nonetheless, true regulatory power over Japanese banks re-
sides in the MOF.103 The Banking Law of 1927 grants the MOF 
such broad supervisory powers that its responsibilities have been 
likened to "those of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Se-
curities and Exchange Commission, state banking commissions 
and policy-making responsibilities of the FRB."lo4 Within this 
broad grant of power, the MOF has considerable discretion to 
tailor its regulations and policies to the needs of individual banks 
in return for their voluntary cooperation with MOF directives. 105 
This regulatory style is called gyosei-shido, or administrative guid-
ance. I06 
98 Japanese Banking Law of 1927, Law No. 21 of 1927, revised in 1981 (Law No. 59), 
effective Apr. 1, 1982 [hereinafter Japanese Banking Law]; see R. DALE, supra note 14, at 
113; Friesen, supra note 6, at 1108. Other laws affecting the Japanese banking system, 
include: (1) Bank of Japan Law, Law No. 67 of 1942, as amended, Sept. 1, 1971; (2) 
Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law, Law No. 228 of 1949, as amended, 
effective Dec. 1, 1980; (3) Long-Term Credit Bank Law, Law No. 187 of 1952, as 
amended, effective Apr. 1, 1962; (4) Foreign Exchange Bank Law, Law No. 67 of 1954, 
as amended, effective Apr. 1, 1963; and (5) Securities and Exchange Law. See Friesen, 
supra note 6, at 1108 n.245. 
99 Friesen, supra note 6, at 1108. 
100Id. at 1109. 
IOIId. 
102 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 113; Friesen, supra note 6, at 1109. 
103 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 113; Friesen, supra note 6, at 1109. 
104 Friesen, supra note 6, at 1109 (quoting Bronte, Inside the Tokyo Ministry of Finance: 
The Most Powerful Men in Japan, EUROMONEY, June 1979, at 24). 
105 E. SYMONS & J. WHITE, supra note 4, at 769. 
106 The flexibility of this regulatory style has made it difficult for foreign banks to plan 
290 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XIII, No.2 
The MOF uses this administrative guidance to effectively seg-
ment the Japanese banking market. 107 Four types of banking 
institutions exist in Japan: commercial city banks, commercial 
regional banks, long-term credit banks, and trust banks. lOS Thir-
teen commercial city banks operate nationwide and are extremely 
active in international banking markets. 109 Sixty-three commercial 
regional banks perform operations similar to those of city banks 
but do so on a smaller scale. llo City banks and regional banks are 
not allowed to accept time deposits with a maturity exceeding two 
years, and they are not allowed to engage in trust activities. I I I 
Three banks provide long-term credit in Japan. 112 These banks 
were established in 1952 to assist in the development of Japanese 
capital markets by issuing debentures and lending funds they 
receive on a long-term basis. ll3 Finally, seven trust banks actively 
engage in trust activities but offer only limited banking services. I 14 
City banks are the principal competitors of foreign banks wish-
ing to enter Japan. 115 Not only do they possess over 50% of all 
Japanese banking assets,116 but they have extremely close contacts 
with industrial companies in Japan. 117 A city bank which is a firm's 
largest creditor is known as its main bank. liS This position allows 
the main bank to exert tremendous control over the firm's policy-
their operations in Japan because they are unable to rely on the substantive provisions 
contained in Japanese banking statutes. Id. 
i07Id. 
1D8 DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FOREIGN GOVERNMENT TREATMENT 
OF U.S. COMMERCIAL BANKING ORGANIZATIONS: 1984 UPDATE 21 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 
UPDATE]; E. SYMONS & J. WHITE, supra note 4, at 770. 
Id. 
1D9 1984 UPDATE, supra note 108, at 21. 
1I0Id. 
IIi E. SYMONS & J. WHITE, supra note 4, at 770. 
112 1984 UPDATE, supra note 108, at 21. 
113 Friesen, supra note 6, at 1110. These banks can also accept longer-term time deposits. 
114 1984 UPDATE, supra note 108, at 21. 
115Id. 
116 !d. 
117 Friesen, supra note 6, at 1110. Prior to World War II, banks were at the center of 
formal industrial conglomerates called zaibatsu. These formal groupings, however, gave 
way to keiretsu, which are informal affiliations between commercial banks and their in-
dustrial customers. These affiliations resulted in the banks having officers on the industrial 
company's board of directors and large positions in that company's stock. All city com-
mercial banks, except Fuji Bank, are members of these influential groupings. See id. at 
1110 & n.262. 
118 E. SYMONS & J. WHITE, supra note 4, at 770. 
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making decisions. llg No foreign bank has ever achieved mam 
bank status. 120 
B. Market Entry 
U.S. banks may enter Japan via representative offices, subsid-
iaries, or branches. 121 Most banks entering Japan do so through 
foreign branches. 122 Irrespective of the entity chosen to enter 
Japanese banking markets, each entrant must apply to the MOF 
for a banking license. 123 In determining whether to grant the 
license, the MOF considers the applicant's financial resources, 
banking expertise, and proposed business plan. 124 The bank must 
have initial minimum capital of one billion yen as well as reputable 
and competent management. 125 Additionally, foreign branches 
must satisfy an economic need criterion,126 and Japanese banks 
must be able to establish similar operations in the foreign branch's 
home country.127 
119 [d. This is bolstered by the fact that they are usually influential shareholders. [d. 
120 [d. 
121 DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FOREIGN GOVERNMENT TREATMENT 
OF U.S. COMMERCIAL BANKING AND SECURITIES ORGANIZATIONS: 1986 UPDATE 73 [here-
inafter 1986 UPDATE]. Article 47 of the Japanese Banking Law refers to branches and 
agent offices of foreign banks but does not refer to subsidiaries. 
122 This is due, in large part, to the fact that Japan discourages foreign-owned banking 
subsidiaries. R. DALE, supra note 14, at 91. 
123 Japanese Banking Law, supra note 98, at art. 47 ("[i]f a person performing banking 
business in a foreign country based on foreign laws . . . intends to perform banking 
business in Japan by establishing a branch or agent office in Japan, said foreign bank 
shall ... obtain the license of the Minister of Finance, for each said branch ... "); see BD. 
OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., REPORT TO CONGRESS ON BANK SUPERVISION IN 
THE GROUP OF TEN NATIONS AND SWITZERLAND 57 (1984) [hereinafter GROUP OF TEN]; 
see also R. DALE, supra note 14, at 113. 
124 Article 47(3) of the Japanese Banking Law refers to the licensing standards estab-
lished in article 4. These standards include: 
1. Sufficient financial resources to "soundly and effectively" engage in the banking 
business (Japanese Banking Law, art. 4(1)); 
2. Sufficient knowledge, expertise and social credit to "precisely, fairly and effectively" 
engage in the banking business (Japanese Banking Law, art. 4(2)); 
3. The bank poses no threat of "throwing financial order into disorder" in view of 
current economic conditions (Japanese Banking Law, art. 4(3)); and 
4. Japanese banks may compete under equal conditions in the foreign bank's home 
country (Japanese Banking Law, art. 4(4)). Japanese Banking Law, supra note 98, at art. 
47(3); see R. DAL£, 5upra note 14, at 113; GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 57-58. 
125 Japanese Banking Law, supra note 98, at art. 5(2). 
1.6 Japanese Banking Law, supra note 98, at art. 4(4). The Ministry of Finance (MOF) 
asks whether a new bank is needed given the current state of japan's economy. See R. 
DALE, supra note 14, at 113; GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 57. 
127 Japanese Banking Law, supra note 98, at arts. 4(2), 4(3), 48. Articles 4(2)-(3) and 48 
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C. Capital Adequacy 
Beyond the initial minimum capitalization of one billion yen, 
the MOF does not seek to establish specific capital adequacy 
requirements. 128 The MOF, however, has used the powerful tool 
of administrative guidance to influence banks' capital positions. 129 
To measure capital, the MOF uses a term described as a bank's 
"own capital" which is the sum of total shareholder equity, loan 
loss reserves, reserves for retirement allowances, and special re-
serves. 130 According to the MOF, a bank's own capital should 
equal at least 10% of the bank's demand deposits and negotiable 
certificates of deposits. 131 Additionally, total loans should average 
no more than 80% of deposits, and fixed assets used in the bank's 
operations should not exceed 50% of net worth. 132 
To assist banks in managing capital growth, the MOF also 
offers administrative guidance concerning dividend payout 
rates. 133 Generally, the MOF limits bank dividends to 15% of the 
face value of the equity instrument with a maximum dividend 
payout ratio equal to 40% of after-tax income. 134 Banks must 
allocate 20% of their cash dividends to a legal reserves account 
until legal reserves equal 100% of the face value of the bank's 
common stock. 135 
D. Liquidity Control 
The MOF does not put great emphasis on liquidity control,l36 
Nevertheless, when deemed necessary, the MOF is forthcoming 
give the MOF broad discretion in making economic need and reciprocity determinations. 
Id.; see GROUP OF TEN, supra hote 123, at 57. 
128 See R. DALE, supra note 14, at 113; GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 59-60; Friesen, 
supra note 6, at 1112-13. 
129 GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 59-60. 
130Id. at 59. 
131Id. 
132Id. 
133 !d. at 60. 
134 !d.; see Friesen, supra note 6, at 1113. 
135 Japanese Banking Law, supra note 98, at art. 18 ("[aJ bank shall, up to reaching the 
amount of capital thereof, respectively accumulate as earned surplus reserve the amount 
of not less than one fifth of the dividend amount in money at each period for settlement 
of accounts ... "). See GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 60; Friesen, supra. note 6, at 
1113. 
136 Friesen, supra note 6, at 1113. One reason the MOF places such little emphasis on 
liquidity is because it has already segmented banking markets according to the m'aturity 
of their operations, i.e., commercial banks, long-term credit banks, and trust banks. See 
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with administrative guidance concerning bank liquidity to prevent 
banks from maturity mismatching. 137 
The MOF defines liquid assets as cash, short-term interbank 
deposits, bankers' acceptances, and readily marketable securi-
ties. 138 Each bank's annual average of liquid assets must exceed 
30% of its annual average of demand deposits coupled with ne-
gotiable certificates of deposit. 139 
Additionally, the MOF has set forth special administrative guid-
ance concerning a bank's Eurocurrency operations. 140 After Feb-
ruary 1983, banks must fund term Eurocurrency lending exceed-
ing one year with 45% Eurocurrency debt maturing in over one 
year. 141 Likewise, banks must fund Eurocurrency loans exceeding 
three years in length by at least 15% Eurocurrency debt having 
a corresponding three year maturity.142 
E. Lending Activities 
Prior to 1982, the MOF also determined lending limits through 
administrative guidance. 143 In 1982, however, the parliament 
amended the Japanese Banking Law to codify, at least in part, 
lending limits applicable to banks. 144 Article 13(1) of the Japanese 
Banking Law prohibits a bank from lending an amount exceeding 
"the total amount of [its] capital and reserves"145 to a single bor-
rower. 
A subsequent MOF administrative order substantially limited 
article 13(1) by stating that city banks and regional banks may 
not loan to a single borrower an amount exceeding 20% of the 
supra notes 107-14 and accompanying text discussing the segmentation of Japanese 
banking markets. 
137 Friesen, supra note 6, at 1113. 
138 GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 59; Friesen, supra note 6, at 1113. 
139 GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 59; Friesen, supra note 6, at 1113. 
140 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 113; Friesen, supra note 6, at 1113. 
141 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 113; Friesen, supra note 6, at 1113. 
142 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 113; Friesen, supra note 6, at 1113. 
143 Friesen, supra note 6, at 1112. 
144 [d. 
145 Japanese Banking Law, supra note 98, at art. 13(1). These lending limits, however, 
do not apply to "the giving of credit to the country or local public bodies, the giving of 
credit whose [repayment is] guaranteed by the government, or the giving of credit 
prescribed by Cabinet Order as being similar thereto." Japanese Banking Law, supra note 
98, at art. 13(2); see Friesen, supra note 6, at 1112 (noting a bank's reserves are synonymous 
with the term "own capital"). 
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bank's "own capital."146 The effect on foreign branches differs in 
that the foreign branch's lending limits are calculated in reference 
to the parent bank's capital and surplus, not the branch's capital 
and surplus. 147 
The MOF and BOJ take no responsibility for creating a country 
risk evaluation system. 148 Rather, the MOF's International Fi-
nance Bureau "assists" a bank in formulating its own country risk 
evaluation based on information provided by the Japan Center 
for International Finance. 149 Despite the MOF's alleged disinter-
est concerning international lending, it nonetheless issued a di-
rective in 1983 requiring banks to: 
1. File a semi-annual report detailing their total exposure to 
major debtor countries; 
2. Establish loan loss provisions for loans to financially troubled 
countries equal to between 1 %-5% of the bank's total exposure 
to each country; and 
3. Limit foreign current asset exposure to fifteen times its "own 
capital" and keep interbank deposit claims and foreign currency 
call loans to 60% of foreign currency assets.150 
F. Foreign Exchange Risk 
The MOF has set loose foreign exchange limits which are ap-
plied daily to a bank's net spot position and to the aggregate of 
its spot and forward position.151 Even though the limits are not 
strictly enforced, banks generally keep their foreign exchange 
exposure below 10% of their capital. I52 
Historically, foreign branches have had limited access to Japan's 
retail banking markets making it difficult for them to attract yen 
deposits.153 Consequently, MOF foreign exchange limits do not 
apply to foreign branch's currency swap limits. 154 This exemption 
146 GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 60; Friesen, supra note 6, at 1112. 
147 GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 60. 
148 Friesen, supra note 6, at 1114. 
149 See GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 60-61; Friesen, supra note 6, at 1114. 
ISO GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 60-61. 
lSI R. DALE, supra note 14, at 114; GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 61; Friesen, supra 
note 6, at 1114. 
IS2 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 114. 
153 1986 UPDATE, supra note 121, at 67-68,70. 
IS4Id. at 71; see Henderson, An Analysis of Interest Rate and Currency Swaps, 11 N .C.j. 
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 497, 498 (1986) (detailing the mechanics of a currency swap 
transaction). 
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permits foreign branches to convert foreign currencies into yen 
and then loan these funds in the Japanese domestic market. 155 
G. Permissible Areas of Business 
The Securities and Exchange Act of 1948 prohibited Japanese 
banks from underwriting all securities except certain public sector 
bonds. 156 The Japanese Banking Law of 1981 perpetuates this 
prohibition by allowing commercial banks to only underwrite and 
offer government bonds and government guaranteed debentures 
to subscribers.157 
The MOF permits banks to engage in other activities which, 
through administrative guidance, it determines are incidental to 
that bank's business. 158 These activities include real estate deal-
ings, leasing activities, and bank equipment maintenance. 159 Fur-
thermore, banks are permitted to own large amounts of corporate 
stock in businesses to which they are a major creditor. 160 
H. Bank Examinations and Disclosure Requirements 
Japanese banking authorities conduct three types of on-site 
bank examinations. 161 First, the MOF conducts a surprise on-site 
examination every two or three years to insure each individual 
bank is run safely and soundly.162 Second, the BOJ conducts a 
scheduled on-site examination every two or three years, but the 
goal of its examinations is to insure the stability of the Japanese 
banking industry as a whole. 163 Finally, the MOF's International 
155 GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 61. This special exemption has allowed foreign 
branches of U.S. banks to capture 45% of the foreign exchange trading market in Japan. 
Holden, Look Who's Winning Tokyo's Currency Sweepstakes, Bus. WK., Apr. II, 1988, at 71-
72. 
156 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 114. The 1948 Securities and Exchange Act was modeled 
after the Glass-Steagall Act. See Tatsuta, Securities Activities of Japanese Banks, 4 J. COMPo 
CORP. L. SEC. REG. 259, 263 (1982). 
157 Japanese Banking Law, supra note 98, at arts. 10(2), II. As of September 1986, eight 
U.S. banks had been granted dealing licenses. These licenses allow the banks to deal in 
the full range of maturities in government bonds. 1986 UPDATE, supra note 121, at 71. 
158 GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 59. 
159/d. 
160 [d.; see supra note 117 and accompanying text (discussing commercial bank affiliations 
with industrial companies). 
161 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 116. 
162 GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 61-62. Article 25 of the Japanese Banking Law, 
which enables the MOF to inspect banks, is entitled "Spot Inspection." 
163 GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 61. 
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Finance Bureau conducts on-site bank examinations to insure a 
bank's foreign exchange operations are in order.164 Foreign 
branches are subject to examinations by all three groupS.165 
The Japanese Banking Law sets forth disclosure requirements 
for Japanese banks. 166 Article 19 requires banks to give the MOF 
an interim and final business report for each business year. 167 
Additionally, article 22 requires that banks compile and make 
public balance sheets, income statements, and other explanatory 
documents within three months after the end of each business 
year. 168 
All banks are subject to the auditing requirements contained 
in the Japanese Commercial Code. 169 Specifically, a bank must 
retain at least two auditors and one certified public accountant. 170 
The auditors are hired by the bank and are primarily responsible 
to bank management, whereas the certified public accountant is 
hired by the shareholders for the express purpose of insuring 
the accuracy of published financial statements. 171 
I. Liquidity Support 
The BOJ provides liquidity support on a short-term basis at 
the so-called "Bank Rate."172 For purposes of borrowing from the 
BOJ, each bank has a discount quota based on the size of its yen 
assets.173 Foreign branches are given a higher quota because of 
their low holdings of yen assets. 174 While the BOJ is primarily 
concerned with a liquidity crisis in yen, it will assist a bank or 
164 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 116. 
165 GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 62. 
166 Japanese Banking Law, supra note 98, at arts. 19-23. 
167Id. at art. 19. Article 17 of the Japanese Banking Law requires a uniform bank 
business year beginning on April I and ending on March 31. Id. at art. 17. 
168 Japanese Banking Law, supra note 98, at arts. 20, 21. Article 22 of the Japanese 
Banking Law requires that the balance sheet, income statement, and business report 
conform to the provisions of article 293-6 of the Japanese Commercial Code and any 
ordinances prescribed by the MOF. 
169 GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 62; Friesen, supra note 6, at 1111. 
170 GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 62; Friesen, supra note 6, at 1111. 
171 GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 62; Friesen, supra note 6, at 1111. 
172 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 149. This is similar to the Federal Reserve's discount rate. 
Additionally, the Bank of Japan (BOJ) may provide for longer-term borrowing if adequate 
collateral is present. Id. 
173Id. 
174 Id. 
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foreign branch experiencing a liquidity crisis in another currency 
by making yen available for conversion purposes. 175 
J. Deposit Insurance 
Japan's deposit insurance fund, the Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration, was formed in 1971.176 The fund received initial capitali-
zation from the government, the BOJ, and the banking indus-
try.177 The fund operates as a going concern by charging each 
bank a premium of .008% of that bank's total insured deposits.17s 
Currently, all deposits at Japanese banks, except interbank de-
posits, are covered up to three million yen per account. 179 De-
posits at foreign branches of U.S. banks are currently not eligible 
for coverage. ISO 
K. Competitive Disadvantages for u.s. Branches 
Japanese commercial city banks have several advantages over 
U.S. banks' foreign branches operating in Japan. Unlike their 
U.S. counterparts, Japanese banks deal with one central authority, 
the MOF, rather than a plethora of regulatory bodies. Not only 
do banks enjoy the simplicity of a singular regulatory authority, 
but they benefit from administrative guidance, a regulatory style 
that is inherently different and likely more efficient than the more 
formal and confrontational style that characterizes the U.S. fi-
nancial institution regulatory processes. For example, new finan-
cial products and services offered by U.S. banks are subjected to 
numerous levels of administrative review often resulting in pro-
tracted litigation. One cannot help but believe that the Japanese 
feel our system is perplexing and, perhaps, amusing. They are 
literally laughing all the way to the Dai-ichi Kangyo Bank, the 
world's largest. 
The MOF has used administrative guidance to encourage the 
growth of a small number of city banks, which possess a high 
concentration of all Japanese banking assets. Such a concentration 
would be unthinkable for U.S. banks by reason of the antitrust 
175/d. For instance, in 1974 the BOJ borrowed dollars at LIBOR to help Japanese banks 
through a nationwide liquidity crisis. Id. 
176 Id.; GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 63. 
I77 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 148; GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 63. 
178 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 148; GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 63-64. 
179 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 148; GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 63. 
180 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 148; GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 63. 
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laws and the geographical constraints imposed by the McFadden 
Act and the Douglas Amendment to the Bank Holding Company 
Act. 
Although Japanese banks are presently constrained from cer-
tain securities underwriting activities as a result of their statutory 
parallel to the Glass-Steagall Act, the Japanese banks, unlike U.S. 
banks, are permitted to invest in large amounts of the stock of 
their debtor commercial clients. This equity tie-in appears to give 
the Japanese banks a competitive advantage unavailable to their 
U.S. counterparts. 
Japanese banks have deposit insurance for accounts, but U.S. 
branches are not able to obtain such coverage from either the 
Japanese Deposit Insurance Corporation or the FDIC. This dis-
parity gives the Japanese banks a significant advantage in their 
ability to attract deposits. 
The Japanese banking regulatory system, like many other areas 
of Japanese commercial enterprise, is characterized by govern-
ment oversight, planning, and encouragement. In contrast, the 
U.S. regulatory system is characterized by governmental over-
sight, reaction, and, at times, populist paranoia. These regulatory 
characteristics reflect the cultural differences between Japan and 
the United States. 
III. THE UNITED KINGDOM-REGULATION OF FOREIGN 
BRANCHES 
A. Overview of the British Banking System 
Historically, British banking regulation has been based on tra-
dition and custom rather than on parliamentary grant. 181 Britain's 
primary bank regulator, the Bank of England (BOE), was 
founded as a private bank in 1694. 182 The BOE acted as a bank 
regulator during the 1800's and actually became part of the Brit-
ish government when the Bank of England Act of 1946 autho-
rized the H.M. Treasury to purchase the BOE.183 Additionally, 
the Bank of England Act gave the BOE "extensive powers to 
request information from and make recommendations to banks, 
and [it] may, with the consent of the H.M. Treasury, issue direc-
IBI E. SYMONS & J. WHITE, supra note 4, at 765. 
IB2Id. 
IB3 Friesen, supra note 6, at 1088. 
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tions to any bank to effect compliance with such request or rec-
ommendation." 184 
After 1946, the BOE exercised its regulatory authority without 
the assistance of statutory guidelines. 185 Realizing that tradition 
and custom were no longer a sufficient basis from which to reg-
ulate banks, Parliament passed the Banking Act of 1979. 186 Not 
only did the Banking Act of 1979 finally establish a statutory basis 
for bank regulation, but it also specifically vested the BOE with 
primary responsibility for such regulation. 187 Furthermore, the 
act created two types of institutions-recognized banks and li-
censed deposit takers. 188 This bifurcated system allowed the BOE 
to maintain its more traditional approach of supervising recog-
nized banks by direct management contact, while implementing 
a more formal, statutory based approach to regulating licensed 
deposit takers.189 
184 [d. The H.M. Treasury is not involved in the day-to-day operations of the Bank of 
England (BOE). Should a widespread banking crisis develop, however, the public would 
expect the H.M. Treasury to support the BOE in assisting the United Kingdom's banking 
industry. [d. 
185/d. 
186 [d. at 1087. 
187 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 126. 
188 [d. at 126-27. The primary distinction between the two types of entities is the range 
of activities in which they engage. The Recognized Bank was allowed to engage in more 
diverse activities but was also subject to greater regulation as the following licensing criteria 
for each institution demonstrates: 
1. Licensed Deposit-Taking Institution -
a. Each director, controller, and manager must be a fit and proper person to hold the 
position; 
b. The business must be directed by a minimum of two managers; and 
c. The business must be conducted in a prudent manner, particularly 
i. There must be minimum net assets of £250,000 and the financial resources must 
be maintained in such a manner as to protect the depositors; 
ii. There must at all times be adequate liquidity; and 
iii. There must be adequate provisions for bad debt. 
2. Recognized Bank -
a. The institution must have a high reputation and standing in the financial community; 
b. The institution must provide a wide range of banking services, or alternatively it 
must provide a highly specialized banking service; 
c. The business must be directed by at least two managers who conduct the business 
with integrity, prudence, and professional skill; and 
d. The institution must maintain financial resources commensurate with its scale of 
operations (£5,000,000 minimum net assets for a wide range of banking services and 
£250,000 minimum net assets for a highly specialized banking service). GROUP OF TEN, 
supra note 123, at 92-93. 
189 [d. 
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The Banking Act of 1979 was superseded by the Banking Act 
of 1987 (1987 Act).190 The 1987 Act perpetuates the BOE's reg-
ulatory responsibility for the British Banking System. 191 The dis-
tinction, however, between recognized banks and licensed deposit 
takers has disappeared to be replaced by the "authori[z]ed insti-
tution."192 
B. Market Entry 
An overseas institution 193 wishing to establish a foreign branch 
in the United Kingdom must notify the BOE at least two months 
before the branch is to begin operations. 194 Such notice shall 
include the name the institution proposes to use in connection 
with its business activities in the United Kingdom. 195 In addition, 
if the overseas institution "is authori[z]ed to take deposits or 
conduct banking business in a country or territory outside the 
United Kingdom by the relevant supervisory authority in that 
country or territory," the BOE may require it to provide a certi-
fied copy of documents from that authority which authorizes it 
to engage in the banking business. 196 
Foreign branches operating in the United Kingdom are not 
required to meet capital adequacy requirements, like domestic 
British banks, because they are part of a larger international 
institution. 197 Consequently, the BOE usually relies on a consoli-
190 The United Kingdom Banking Act, 1987 [hereinafter Banking Act of 1987] reprinted 
in Halsbury's Laws of England (vol. 4 1987 reissue). 
191 [d. at § 1(1) ("[t]he Bank of England ... shall have ... the duty generally to supervise 
the institutions authori[z]ed by it in the exercise of those powers"). In addition, the 
Banking Act of 1987 established the Board of Banking Supervision (Board) which consists 
of the Governor, the Deputy Governor, the Executive Director of the Bank of England, 
and six independent members appointed by both the Chancellor of the Exchequer and 
the Governor of the Bank of England. [d. at § 2(2)(a), (b). The Board's primary function 
is to assist the Governor of the Bank of England in implementing the supervisory pro-
visions of the Banking Act of 1987. See id. at § 2, General Note. 
192 [d. at § 106(1). 
193 The Banking Act of 1987 does not refer specifically to foreign banks, instead relying 
on the more broadly defined term "overseas institution." See id. at § 74(1)-(2). 
194 [d. at § 75(1). 
195 [d. at § 75(1)(a). The BOE reserves the right to disallow the use of any name it 
believes would be misleading to the public. [d. at § 76. 
196 [d. at § 79(2)(d). 
197 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 127. The H.M. Treasury and the BOE, however, possess 
statutory authority to prescribe individual regulations for any overseas institution desiring 
to establish a representative office in the United Kingdom. See Banking Act of 1987, supra 
note 190, at § 80(1). 
1990] INTERNATIONAL BANKING 301 
dated assessment of the parent bank's management and financial 
soundness by that bank's primary supervisory authority.19B The 
BOE, however, always makes its own determination of the bank's 
reputation and standing in the financial community.199 
C. Capital Adequacy 
The BOE does not attempt to apply capital adequacy ratios 
uniformly to banking institutions.20o Instead, the BOE has devised 
two capital ratios which allow it to consider each institution's 
consolidated capital position in view of the particular circum-
stances confronting that institution both in the United Kingdom 
and abroad.201 Common to both ratios is the capital base which 
consists of share capital, reserves, general bad debt provisions, 
minority interests, and subordinated debt. 202 
One capital ratio, the gearing ratio, relates a bank's current 
liabilities to its capital resources. 203 This is accomplished by divid-
ing the adjusted capital base by contingent liabilities.204 Mathe-
Adjusted Capital Base 
Public Liabilities 
Table II. 
[(Capital Base) - (Investments In Other 
Businesses + Goodwill + Bank Premises)] 
[Deposits + Short Term Non-Contingent Liabilities]205 
The risk-asset ratio is the more traditional measure of capital 
adequacy because it measures capital in relation to the bank's 
potentiallosses.206 Various assets are weighted according to their 
198 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 127; cf Banking Act of 1987, supra note 190, at § 79(2)(d). 
For foreign branches of U.S. banks, this supervisory authority would be the OCC, FRB, 
or FDIC. 
199 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 127. It is unclear whether the relevant financial community 
is limited to the United Kingdom or consists of world-wide financial markets. 
200 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 127; GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 95; Friesen, supra 
note 6, at 1092. 
201 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 127; GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 95; Friesen, supra 
note 6, at 1092. 
202 GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 95. Only one-third of a bank's capital base may 
consist of subordinated debt. Friesen, supra note 6, at 1092. 
203 GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 95-96. 
204 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 127; GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 95; Friesen, supra 
note 6, at 1092. 
205 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 127; GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 95-96; Friesen, 
supra note 6, at 1092. 
206 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 127; GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 96; Friesen, supra 
note 6, at 1092. 
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perceived susceptibility to credit risk, interest rate risk, and forced 
sale risk. 207 Commercial loans are the standard by which other 
assets are measured and are given a risk weight of one.208 Once 
risk weights are assigned, each balance sheet asset is multiplied 
by its risk weight, and the resulting total is called adjusted risk 
assets. 209 This total is divided into the adjusted capital base210 
yielding the institution's risk asset ratio. 211 
D. Liquidity Control 
The BOE is concerned with two types of potential liquidity 
problems facing financial institutions-funding risk and interest 
rate mismatch risk. 212 Funding risk is the chance a bank will not 
have sufficient cash on-hand to satisfy all obligations falling due 
on a certain day.213 Interest rate mismatch risk is the risk that a 
bank will suffer losses due to adverse movements in interest 
rates. 214 
While the BOE does not impose specific liquidity requirements 
on banks, it nevertheless closely monitors each institution's li-
quidity position.215 Liquidity is measured on a cash flow basis with 
207 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 127. Credit risk is the risk a borrower will become unable 
to make payments on its loan; investment risk is the susceptibility the loan will be affected 
by adverse moments in interest rates; and forced sale risk is the risk a bank will have to 
liquidate the asset. F.L. GARCIA & G. MUNN, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BANKING AND FINANCE 233, 
396,494 (8th ed. 1984). 
208 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 127. 
209 ld. 
210 The adjusted capital base is identical to that used in the gearing ratio except that 
bank premises and equipment are not deducted from the total. GROUP OF TEN, supra note 
123, at 96. 
211 Risk asset ratio computations would look as follows: 
Table C. 
Step #1 
Asset # 1 * Risk Weighting = Risk Adjusted Value 
Asset #2 * Risk Weighting = Risk Adjusted Value 
*. .. _ Risk Adjusted Value 
Asset #3 Risk Welghtmg - T I R' k Ad' d A ota IS Juste ssets 
Step #2 
Adju~ted C~pital Base = Risk Asset Ratio 
Total Risk Adjusted Assets 
212 Friesen, supra note 6, at 1093. 
213 ld. 
214ld. 
215 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 128. 
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assets and liabilities in all currencies considered together.216 Assets 
and liabilities are inserted into one of five time periods on a 
maturity ladder.217 The sum of all assets from one time period is 
deducted from the sum of all liabilities in that time period.218 
The result is a net mismatch position which allows the BOE to 
assess quantitatively an institution's liquidity.219 While the BOE 
considers each foreign branch's capital adequacy on a consoli-
dated basis with the parent bank, it monitors each foreign 
branch's liquidity individually placing particular emphasis on the 
foreign branch's liquidity in British pounds.220 
E. Lending Activities 
Banks and foreign branches are required to file a quarterly 
report with the BOE detailing their ten largest outstanding loans 
and guarantees.221 While the 1987 Act contains no statutory lend-
ing limits, the BOE has "suggested" that banks' total exposure to 
one borrower should not exceed 10% of their capital base.222 
Moreover, if exposure to an individual borrower exceeds the 10% 
limit, the BOE expects the bank to raise its capital level so that 
adequate capital ratios are maintained.223 
The BOE closely monitors country risk through semiannual 
reports submitted by banks that detail outstanding loans to non-
216Id. 
217 GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 96. The maturity periods range from sight-8 days 
to 6-12 months. Id. All assets are subject to a discount for credit risk, investment risk, or 
forced sale risk. R. DALE, supra note 14, at 128; see supra note 203 (discussion of these 
three risks). 
218 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 128; GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 96. 
219 GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 96. 
220 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 128. To measure a foreign branch's liquidity on a consol-
idated basis would not be meaningful since the BOE is only concerned with liquidity and 
its effects on the British banking system. 
221 GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 97. 
222Id. Total exposure consists of both outstanding loans and guarantees. Id. Regulatory 
concern over large exposures resulted in the enactment of § 38 of the Banking Act of 
1987, which provides in part: 
(1) An authori[z]ed institution, other than one whose principal place of business 
is outside the United Kingdom [effectively excluding British branches of U.S. 
banks], shall make a report to the [BOE] if -
(a) it has entered into a transaction or transactions relating to anyone person 
as a result of which it is exposed to the risk of incurring losses in excess of 10% 
of its available capital resources .... 
Banking Act of 1987, supra note 190, at § 38. 
223 GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 97. 
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residents. 224 If the BOE believes a bank's total exposure to one 
country is inappropriate for that country's economic or political 
climate, it will ask the bank to reduce its exposure by selling or 
calling in a portion of its loans.225 
F. Foreign Exchange Risk 
The BOE regularly monitors each bank's foreign exchange 
exposure and, in so doing, distinguishes between "structural" 
positions and "dealing" positions.226 A "structural" position is 
foreign exchange exposure arising from the presence of long-
term foreign currency assets and liabilities on the bank's balance 
sheet.227 Conversely, a "dealing" position is foreign exchange ex-
posure inherent in the bank's daily operations.228 While "struc-
tural" positions are factored into a bank's capital adequacy equa-
tion, they are excluded from the BOE's foreign exchange 
guidelines.229 
Generally, the BOE's foreign exchange guidelines for banks 
experienced in foreign exchange are as follows: 
1. A bank's net dealing position in anyone currency should 
not exceed 10% of its capital base; and 
2. A bank's aggregate net dealing position for all currencies 
should not exceed 15% of the bank's capital base.23o 
The BOE, however, does not impose the foregoing limits on 
foreign branches when the parent bank's internal controls, cou-
pled with the monitoring arrangements of the parent bank's su-
pervisory authority, are deemed adequate.231 
G. Permissible Areas of Business 
The BOE imposes no formal restrictions on activities in which 
a bank may engage.232 The BOE does, however, expect to receive 
224 [d. 
225/d. 
226 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 128; Friesen, supra note 6, at 1093. 
227 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 128; GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 98; Friesen, supra 
note 6, at 1093-94. 
228 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 128; GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 98; Friesen, supra 
note 6, at 1093-94. 
229 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 128; Friesen, supra note 6, at 1093-94. 
2'0 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 128; Friesen, supra note 6, at 1094. As with the British 
banking system in general, these requirements are extremely adaptable to each bank's 
circumstances. R. DALE, supra note 14, at 128. 
m R. DALE, supra note 14, at 129. 
2'2 [d. at 128; GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 94. 
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advance notice concerning any bank's investment of more than 
15% in any business.233 Furthermore, the BOE only allows in-
vestment in a non-banking entity if the proposed investment is 
financial in nature, of minimal risk, and small in proportion to 
the bank's asset base.234 
H. Bank Examinations and Disclosure Requirements 
Generally, the BOE neither conducts on-site bank examinations 
nor regularly assesses the quality of a bank's loan portfolio. 235 
Instead, the BOE constantly reviews statistical data taken from 
monthly reports submitted by supervised institutions as re-
quired.236 This data becomes the focal point of interviews the 
BOE regularly conducts with the senior management of a bank 
or foreign branch to gain an understanding of the institution's 
financial health and management capabilities.237 
Other than reports given to the BOE, banks are under no 
special reporting requirements. 238 The Companies Act of 1948 
does require all corporations, including banks, to prepare an 
annual consolidated balance sheet and income statement and to 
file these reports with the Registrar of Companies.239 While the 
statements are normally only available for public inspection at 
the Registrar's office, the 1987 Act requires all banks to have 
copies of these reports available for public inspection at every 
office where deposits are accepted.240 
1. Liquidity Support 
Much like the Federal Reserve, the BOE provides short-term 
liquidity assistance to banks in the United Kingdom. 241 Addition-
233 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 128. 
234Id. 
235Id. at 129; GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 98-99. The Banking Act of 1987, 
however, gives the BOE tremendous power in requesting information and investigating 
authorized institutions. See Banking Act of 1987, supra note 190, at § 39 (giving the BOE 
power to obtain information and require production of documents), § 40 (giving the BOE 
power to enter authorized institutions to obtain information and documents), § 41 (giving 
the BOE power to appoint investigators to examine the workings of an authorized insti-
tution). 
236 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 129; GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 99. 
237 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 129; GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 99. 
238 Friesen, supra note 6, at 1089. 
239 GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 100. 
240 Banking Act of 1987, supra note 190, at § 45(1). 
241 GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 100. Liquidity assistance is provided to facilitate 
orderly financial markets and to implement monetary policy. Id. 
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ally, the BOE may provide long-term liquidity support to individ-
ual banks, but such assistance is generally limited to institutions 
experiencing severe financial difficulties and whose failure would 
undermine confidence in the British banking system.242 Foreign 
branches, however, are viewed as the responsibility of the parent 
bank's supervisory authority for liquidity purposes and are, there-
fore, excluded from receiving BOE liquidity support.243 
J. Deposit Insurance 
Sections 21-33 of the Banking Act of 1979 established the 
Deposit Protection Board (Board) and the Deposit Protection 
Fund (Fund).244 The 1987 Act provides for the continuing exis-
tence of both.245 The Board is responsible for managing all as-
pects of the Fund's operation including managing the Fund's 
assets and applying them to particular situations as needed.246 
The 1987 Act provides that 75% of a deposit up to £20,000 
will be repaid to a depositor if his depository institution becomes 
insolvent.247 The Fund is financed by mandatory contributions 
from authorized institutions.248 Because a foreign branch of a 
U.S. bank comes within the definition of "authori[z]ed institution" 
for purposes of the Fund's operation, it must make mandatory 
contributions to the Fund.249 
K. Competitive Disadvantages for United States Branches 
The chief competitive advantage for British banks over U.S. 
bank branches operating in the United Kingdom is that British 
banks are not subject to formal restrictions on the types of activ-
ities in which they may engage. By contrast, U.S. banks' foreign 
branches are constrained from engaging in merchant or invest-
242Id. 
243 Friesen, supra note 6, at 1095. 
244 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 151; Friesen, supra note 6, at 1095. 
245 Banking Act of 1987, supra note 190, at § 50(1). 
246Id. at § 50(2). 
247Id. at §§ 58(1), 60(1). The depository institution must be an authorized institution as 
defined in § 106(1) Banking Act of 1987. 
248/d. at § 52( 1). 
249 The term "authori[z]ed institution" defined in § 106(1) of the Banking Act of 1987 
encompasses what is commonly referred to as a foreign branch. Because this term is only 
altered in the Banking Act of 1987 for §§ 74-81 [Overseas Institutions with Representative 
Offices], foreign branches must contribute a percentage of deposits to the Fund. Id. at 
§ 61(1) ("[a]1I authori[z]ed institutions shall be liable to contribute to the Fund .... "). 
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ment banking activities by virtue (or vice) of the Glass-Steagall 
Act. 
U.S. banks' foreign branches participate in the Fund which 
means that, in theory, these branches are not disadvantaged in 
competing for deposits. The U.S. Congress should study the 
British deposit insurance system as a model for rebuilding the 
U.S. system. The British system, which insures only up to 75% 
of certain amounts deposited, has the advantage of imposing 
market discipline for sound management through depositors as 
well as from shareholders and regulators. In light of the temper-
ament of Congress, and particularly in face of the thrift debacle, 
however, adoption of the British deposit insurance model seems 
unlikely at present. 
The competitive advantages of the United Kingdom's partici-
pation in the European Community are assessed in part VI of 
this Article, but it should be noted here that such advantages are 
likely to be great, at least from a psychological point of view. 
IV. THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANy-REGULATION OF 
FOREIGN BRANCHES 
A. Overview of the Federal Republic of Germany's Banking System 
All commercial banks in the Federal Republic of Germany 
(FRG) are subject to the provisions of the Banking Act of the 
Federal Republic of Germany (Banking Act).25o Pursuant to the 
Banking Act, the Federal Banking Supervisory Office (FBSO) has 
primary authority to supervise banks.251 The FBSO's statutory 
duties include "counteract[ing] undesirable elements in banking 
which may endanger the safety of the assets entrusted to banks, 
adversely affect the orderly conduct of banking business or result 
in serious disadvantages for the national economy."252 Despite its 
wide ranging regulatory powers, the FBSO does not have a large 
staff.253 Consequently, the FBSO works closely with the Deutsche 
250 See Gesetz tiber das Kreditwesen § I (I) (defining what acts constitute the "banking 
business"), § 32(1) (requiring all parties engaged in the "banking business" to receive a 
banking license which subjects them to the provisions of the German Banking Act), 1985 
BCBI.I 1472 (W. Ger.) [hereinafter German Banking Act). 
251 [d. at § 6(1) ("[t)he Federal Banking Supervisory Office exercises supervision over 
the banks in accordance with the provisions of this Act"); see R. DALE, supra note 14, at 
134; GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 37; Friesen, supra note 6, at 1098. 
252 German Banking Act, supra note 250, at § 6(2). 
253 Friesen, supra note 6, at 1100. 
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Bundesbank (Bundesbank), and it will not issue regulations be-
fore obtaining the Bundesbank's full approvaJ.254 
The Bundesbank Act of 1957 establishes the Bundesbank's role 
in relation to the government.255 The Bundesbank is primarily 
responsible for controlling monetary policy, much like the Fed-
eral Reserve does in the United States.256 Furthermore, because 
the Bundesbank maintains a bank supervision department, it is 
responsible for collecting and evaluating reports from commer-
cial banks.257 Once the Bundesbank evaluates a report, it is given 
to the FBSO so that appropriate supervisory action can be 
taken.258 
B. Market Entry 
All persons wishing to enter the banking industry in the FRG 
must apply to the FBSO for a banking license.259 The following 
statutory criteria must be satisfied before the FBSO will grant 
such a license: 
1. The bank must possess initial minimum capital of 
DM6,OOO,OOO;260 
2. The bank must be run by a minimum of two managers; 
3. The managers must be qualified to run the bank, and must 
also be trustworthy individuals; and 
4. The bank must submit a detailed business plan.261 
If these statutory criteria are satisfied, the FBSO must grant 
the license.262 The FBSO has discretion, however, to attach fur-
ther conditions which must be satisfied before the banking license 
254 [d. This closeness between the Federal Banking Supervisory Office (FBSO) and 
Bundesbank is based largely on statute. The German Banking Act at § 7(1) provides: 
The Federal Banking Supervisory Office and the Deutsche Bundesbank coop-
erate as provided in this Act. The Deutsche Bundesbank and the Federal Banking 
Supervisory Office shall communicate to each other any observations and findings 
which may be of significance for the performance of their respective functions. 
255 Friesen, supra note 6, at 109S. 
256 [d. 
257 [d. at 109S. 
258 See German Banking Act, supra note 250, at § 7(1). 
259 [d. at § 32(1); see R. DALE, supra note 14, at 134; GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 
3S. 
260 See R. Dale, supra note 14, at 134; Group of Ten, supra note 123, at 3S. 
261 [d. at § 33. 
262 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 134. The German Banking Act does not mandate the 
issuance of the license; rather, § 33 of the German Banking Act has a negative control 
feature stating "[tJhe license may be refused only" if the statutory criteria are not satisfied. 
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is granted.263 In the case of commercial banks and foreign 
branches, the FBSO generally requires membership in the Fund 
as a prerequisite for obtaining a banking license.264 
c. Capital Adequacy 
The Banking Act requires that all commercial banks in the 
FRG maintain an adequate level of capital. 265 The Banking Act 
defines capital as the sum of paid-in capital, reserves, retained 
earnings, and participation certificates.266 For the purposes of 
foreign branches, however, capital is the sum of working capital 
made available to the branch and operating surpluses less the 
branch's net intercompany claims.267 
Pursuant to enabling authority contained in the Banking Act, 
FBSO and Bundesbank guidelines establish prudential ratios ap-
plicable to banks and foreign branches.268 Principle I of these 
guidelines establishes a capital adequacy requirement and states 
that loans and equity participations, exclusive of loan loss provi-
sions, may not exceed eighteen times a bank's capital.269 More-
over, Principle I incorporates a risk adjusting feature in the cap-
ital adequacy equation by weighting various groups of assets 
according to their perceived risk. 270 Principle I assigns the follow-
ing risk weighting factors to various assets that may appear on a 
bank's balance sheet: 271 
263 German Banking Act, supra note 250, at § 32(2). Pursuant to this section, the Federal 
Banking Supervisory Office (FBSO) may also limit the license to certain types of banking. 
264 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 134. 
265 German Banking Act, supra note 250, at § 10(1). 
266 [d. at § 10(2). Participation certificates, or genusscheine, are equity certificates which 
give the bearer a right to share in bank profits but not a right to vote at the bank's annual 
meeting. These participation certificates may not comprise more than 25% of a bank's 
capital. [d. at § 10(5); see Friesen, supra note 6, at 1103. 
267 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 135. 
268 German Banking Act, supra note 250, at § 10(1). 
269 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 135; GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 40. The eighteen 
times capital requirement works out to a capital asset ratio of 5.6%. If capital falls below 
this mark, there is a rebuttable presumption that corrective action is needed. R. DALE, 
supra note 14, at 135. 
270 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 135. For a complete discussion of Principle I, see DEUTSCHE 
BUNDESBANK, SPECIAL SERIES No.2, BANKING ACT OF THE FEDERAL REpUBLIC OF GERMANY 
8 (1986) [hereinafter SPECIAL SERIES]. 
271 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 135. 
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The Banking Act also requires that banks and foreign branches 
located in the FRG be sufficiently liquid at all times.272 Principles 
II and III, adopted by the FBSO and the Bundesbank, ensure 
this requirement is met.273 Both principles attempt to limit ma-
turity mismatching on a bank's balance sheet while recognizing 
that a higher proportion of short-term liabilities is generally nec-
essary to form a stable funding base.274 Generally, Principle II 
requires that long-term assets be matched with long-term liabili-
ties, and Principle III establishes ratios for matching medium-
term assets to short-term and medium-term liabilities.275 Failure 
to comply with these ratios carries with it a presumption that 
corrective action is needed.276 
E. Lending Activities 
The Banking Act also contains detailed rules concerning bank 
lending activities.277 Grosskredit (large loan) is defined as an exten-
sion of credit to a single borrower which exceeds 15% of the 
bank's equity capital,278 There are two separate rules regarding 
272 German Banking Act, supra note 250, at § 11. As in the United Kingdom, foreign 
branch liquidity is considered individually for each branch located in Germany. R. DALE, 
supra note 14, at 128, 135; see supra note 216 and accompanying text. 
273 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 135; GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 41; Friesen, supra 
note 6, at 1103; see SPECIAL SERIES, supra note 270, at 8-9 (detailed discussion of these 
principles). 
274 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 135; GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 41. Most depositors 
also have liquidity concerns and, consequently, keep the m'\iority of their deposits in 
demand accounts or short-term time deposits. 
275 GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 41; Friesen, supra note 6, at 1103. 
276 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 135; Friesen, supra note 6, at 1103. 
277 German Banking Act, supra note 250, at §§ 13-20. 
278Id. at § 13(1); see R. DALE, supra note 14, at 136; GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 
42; Friesen, supra note 6, at 1101. 
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Grosskredite. First, no Grosskredit may exceed 50% of a bank's cap-
ital. 279 Second, the sum of all Grosskredite may not exceed eight 
times the bank's capital.280 Additionally, each Grosskredit must be 
promptly reported to the Bundesbank.281 
Organkredite (insider loans) are also subject to rules contained 
in the Banking Act.282 Organkredit is defined as an extension of 
credit to any company affiliated with the bank, an employee of 
an affiliated company, or a bank employee.283 Organkredite must 
have unanimous approval of both the bank's managers and board 
of directors prior to releasing the funds. 284 Additionally, all 
Organkredite exceeding DM250,000 must be reported to the FBSO 
and the Bundesbank.285 
The FBSO and the Bundesbank do not attempt to compile and 
provide banks with country risk information concerning inter-
nationallending.286 Rather, banks must establish and implement 
their own country risk evaluation system.287 Once the system is 
in place, the bank must periodically report its country risk infor-
mation to the FBSO and Bundesbank along with its plans for 
dealing with these risks.288 
F. Foreign Exchange Risk 
FRG banking regulators closely monitor foreign exchange ac-
tivities of each commercial bank and foreign branch located in 
the FRG. Principle I(a) provides that a bank's net open position, 
irrespective of due dates, may not exceed 30% of the bank's 
279 German Banking Act, supra note 250, at § 13(4}. 
280 [d. at § 13(3}. 
281 [d. at § 13(1}. Pursuant to this section, the FBSO may order banks to annually submit 
a list of large loans. In addition to the rules regarding grosskredite, § 14 of the German 
Banking Act requires banks to "report to the Deutche Bundesbank by the fifteenth day 
of January, April, July and October those borrowers whose indebtedness to them 
amounted to one million Deutche Mark or more at any time during the three calendar 
months preceding the reporting date." 
282 [d. at §§ 15-17. 
28S [d. at § 15(1},(2}. 
284 [d. at § 15(1}. If Organkredite are granted contrary to this section, the bank's managers 
and members of its supervisory body are jointly and severally liable to the bank for any 
loss it sustains as a result of the loan being granted. [d. at § 17(1}. 
285 [d. at § 16. 
286 Friesen, supra note 6, at 1104. 
287 [d. 
288 [d. 
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capital at the close of any business day.289 The net open position 
is calculated by aggregating the assets for each foreign currency 
and precious meta1.290 A net positive position in one foreign 
currency or precious metal may not be used to offset a net neg-
ative position in another.291 In addition, Principle I(a) also limits 
net foreign currency transactions maturing in anyone calendar 
month or half year to 40% of capital.292 
G. Permissible Business Activities 
The hallmark of the FRG's banking system is the "universal" 
bank.293 The word "universal" is particularly descriptive because 
there are literally no limits upon the activities in which banks of 
the FRG may engage.294 Banks of the FRG perform a wide range 
of commercial and investment banking functions including the 
underwriting and sale of securities.295 Moreover, banks are per-
mitted to, and frequently do, engage in a wide variety of nonfi-
nancial activities including ownership of nonfinancial compa-
nies.296 
289 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 136; GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 41; see SPECIAL 
SERIES, supra note 270, at 8. 
290 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 136; GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 41. 
291 GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 41. Because long and short positions are aggre-
gated, the effective maximum long or short foreign exchange position is 15%. R. DALE, 
supra note 14, at 136. 
292 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 136. 
29' R. DALE, supra note 14, at 135-36; GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 39. 
294 Section 3 of the German Banking Act only prohibits banks from engaging in: 
1. the conducting of deposit business if the majority of the depositors are persons 
employed by the enterprise (employee savings banks-Werksparkassen) , unless 
other banking business is conducted which exceeds the scale of such deposit 
business; 
2. the acceptance of sums of money if the majority of the lenders have a legal 
right to loans being granted to them or objects being supplied to them on credit 
out of these sums of money (savings enterprises for specific purposes-Zweckspa-
runternehmen); this does not apply to building and loan associations; 
3. the conducting of lending business or deposit business if, by agreement or in 
accordance with business practice, it is impossible or very difficult to withdraw 
the amount of the loan or the deposits in cash. 
295 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 136; GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 39. 
296 GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 39-40. The following statement best displays the 
advantages German banks gain from being able to invest in non-financial entities: 
U.S. banks can only stare in envy at the iron bonds between industry and some 
European banks, such as Deutsche Bank. The West German institution owns ... 
more than $5 billion in a broad range of German industrial firms, including a 
controlling interest in Daimler-Benz, the nation's largest industrial firm. Deutsche 
Bank stock, says Solomon Brothers analyst Tom Hanley, "is like a mutual fund 
of West Germany's leading commercial enterprises." The institution is enor-
mously profitable because it can not only engage in commercial banking but can 
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H. Bank Examinations and Disclosure Requirements 
The Banking Act of 1961 permits the FBSO to conduct on-site 
examinations or to appoint external auditors to conduct exami-
nations of FRG banks and foreign branches.297 Due to its limited 
staff, the FBSO generally appoints external auditors to examine 
banks who, in turn, file detailed reports of their findings with the 
FBSO.298 In addition to the auditor's report, the FBSO receives 
numerous other reports from banks which it uses for supervisory 
and statistical purposes.299 
FRG banks are also required to prepare an annual balance 
sheet and income statement. 300 Banks must compile a preliminary 
balance sheet and income statement within three months of each 
fiscal year end and complete a final audited balance sheet and 
income statement within five months of the fiscal year end.30l 
Copies of both the preliminary and final audited statements must 
be filed with the FBSO and the Bundesbank.302 
I. Liquidity Support 
FRG banks and foreign branches in need of liquidity support 
have two options. The first and primary source of liquidity is the 
Bundesbank.303 The Bundesbank acts much like the U.S. Federal 
Reserve by rediscounting eligible instruments.304 Each institution, 
also underwrite and trade securities and is a major player in the Euromoney 
markets, to which U.S. corporations are increasingly turning. 
Work, supra note 1, at 53. 
297 German Banking Act, supra note 250, at § 44. 
298 Friesen, supra note 6, at 1100. Section 28(1) of the German Banking Act specifically 
authorizes the FBSO to appoint special auditors. Once appointed, § 29(1) of the German 
Banking Act empowers the auditors to "examine the financial circumstances of the bank 
and ascertain whether the bank has complied with the reporting requirements laid down 
in [the German Banking Act]." 
If during the course of the audit, an auditor "learns of facts which might warrant the 
qualification or refusal of the certificate of audit, endanger the existence of the bank or 
gravely impair its development, or which indicate that the managers have seriously vio-
lated the law, the articles of association or partnership agreement," the auditor is required 
to immediately report these findings to the FBSO and the Deutsche Bundesbank (Bun-
desbank). German Banking Act, supra note 250, at § 29(2). 
2991d. at § 25; see GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 43. 
300 Id. 
301 German Banking Act, supra note 250, at § 26(1) (preliminary balance sheet and 
income statement within three months), § 27(1) (final audited balance sheet and income 
statement within five months). 
3021d. at § 26(1). 
303 GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 45. 
304 See id. 
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however, is prescribed a discount quota with the Bundesbank 
and, generally, may not exceed this quota.305 
Because banks are limited in the amount they may borrow from 
the Bundesbank, the Bundesbank and the domestic banking in-
dustry combined in 1974 to form the second option, the Liquidity 
Consortium Bank (Liko Bank).306 The Liko Bank's function is to 
assist otherwise solvent banks which are experiencing temporary 
liquidity difficulties and are unable to borrow further from the 
Bundesbank.307 Because the Liko Bank's capital base is relatively 
small, however, it can only assist smaller institutions, and, to date, 
its facilities have been used very little.30s 
J. Deposit Insurance 
The Banking Act does not provide for deposit insurance.30g 
The Federal Association of German Banks, however, has estab-
lished the Deposit Guarantee Fund. 310 This fund protects deposits 
up to a limit, per depositor, of 30% of the member bank's equity 
capital.311 Membership in the fund is voluntary, and each member 
bank is assessed a membership fee of .003% of insurable deposit 
liabilities.312 Potential payout in the event of bank failure is limited 
to the size of the fund, and payment of funds is always discre-
tionary.313 
K. Competitive Disadvantage for United States Branches 
The German banking regulatory structure is less complex and, 
doubtless, more efficient than that existing in the United States. 
German banks are truly merchant and investment banks and 
305Id. 
306 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 155; GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 45; Friesen, supra 
note 6, at 1105. The Bundesbank owns 30% of the Liquidity Consortium Bank (Liko 
Bank). R. DALE, supra note 14, at 155. 
307 GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 45. 
308Id. The Liko Bank has DM250,000,000 paid-in capital and DM750,000,000 capital 
which is callable from member institutions. Id. 
309 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 155; GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 45. 
310 See SPECIAL SERIES, supra note 270, at 12. 
311 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 155. 
312 Id.; GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 45. Membership is voluntary unless the FBSO 
makes it a prerequisite to obtaining a banking license pursuant to § 32(2) of the German 
Banking Act. GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 45; see supra note 263 and accompanying 
text (discussing FBSO discretion in this area). 
313 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 155; GROUP OF TEN, supra note 123, at 45. 
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regularly engage in a broad spectrum of commercial, financial, 
and non-financial activities. By contrast, U.S. banks' foreign 
branches are constrained by U.S. law from engaging in many of 
these activities. The most obvious are the constraints imposed by 
the Glass-Steagall Act insofar as U.S. banks are forbidden from 
underwriting equities. 
German banks are given latitude to participate in the economic 
life of Germany to an extent unimaginable for U.S. banks. For 
example, the Deutsche Bank owns a controlling interest in Daim-
ler Benz, the West German industrial giant. Such arrangements 
would be inconceivable and certainly unlawful under the present 
U.S. regulatory structure. Imagine, to your horror or delight, 
Citicorp owning a controlling interest in General Electric. 
German law per se does not provide for deposit insurance. As 
a condition precedent to obtaining a banking license, however, 
most U.S. banks' foreign branches are required to become mem-
bers of the privately-created Deposit Guarantee Fund. Conse-
quently, the German deposit insurance scheme provides German 
banks with no advantage in their ability to attract deposits. 
L. Summary of Foreign Banking Systems 
The sections of this Article which discuss the Japanese, British, 
and West German banking systems are, by necessity, lengthy in 
nature. As a result, the reader may at times have difficulty in 
comparing these systems on a meaningful basis. Accordingly, the 
table in Appendix I lists each regulatory area by country so the 
reader can quickly compare and contrast each country's regula-
tion of U.S. branches. 
v. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE-U.S. REGULATION OF 
FOREIGN BRANCHES 
As the foregoing review indicates, there currently exists little 
agreement among U.S., Japanese, British, and West German 
bank supervisory authorities' views toward regulation of banks in 
general, much less foreign branches of U.S. banks. This lack of 
regulatory concensus prevents international banking markets 
from operating at peak efficiency and, in addition, creates advan-
tages for banks chartered by and operating in certain countries. 
Unfortunately, few, if any, of these advantages accrue to the 
benefit of U.S. banks' foreign branches. Rather, restrictive U.S. 
bank regulations act as a governor and prevent U.S. banks' for-
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eign branches from realizing their full competitive potential in 
international banking markets. 
Examples of V.S. bank regulations which negatively affect for-
eign branches in some manner include reserve requirements on 
foreign branch deposits and limits on foreign branch lending in 
the host country. In addition, there is a prevailing fear that ex-
panded foreign branch activity may, in some way, imperil the 
V.S. deposit insurance system despite the fact that foreign branch 
deposits are not insured. While changing these regulations and 
attitudes can be accomplished by the Vnited States, such unilat-
eral action is not prudent. Instead, these changes should be 
undertaken only after V.S. regulators have discussed them with 
bank regulators in other countries with a view toward harmoniz-
ing the international banking regulatory system. Accordingly, fur-
ther discussion concerning these types of changes should be de-
ferred until after presentation of recent efforts to coordinate 
international banking regulation. 
There is, however, one regulation that stands alone in placing 
V.S. banks' foreign branches at a distinct disadvantage in inter-
national banking markets-the Glass-Steagall Act. The Glass-
Steagall Act separates commercial banking from investment bank-
ing and effectively precludes foreign branches from offering 
many services normal to the banking business in the host country. 
The legislation which allows banks to operate foreign branches 
includes the Glass-Steagall Act's investment banking prohibition 
and states that the "foreign branch [may not] engage or partici-
pate, directly or indirectly, in the business of underwriting, sell-
ing, or distributing securities."314 Because prohibitions similar to 
the Glass-Steagall Act are incident to the banking systems of very 
few countries, the Vnited States should unilaterally repeal the 
Glass-Steagall Act, at least to the extent it affects foreign branch 
operations. Recognizing the obsolescence of the Glass-Steagall 
Act, no less an authority than Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the 
Board of Governors of the FRS has stated: 
The key reform needed ... is, of course, repeal of the Glass-
Steagall separations of commercial and investment banking. 
314 12 U.S.C. § 604(a) (1986). U.S. banks are permitted to participate in international 
investment banking through subsidiaries. 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(d)(13) (1989). Fore.ign subsid-
iaries, however, are not as large or as well capitalized as foreign branches making them a 
less than ideal vehicle from which to conduct investment banking activities. See supra notes 
22,71 (discussing the ability of U.S. banks to engage in investment banking activities). 
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The provision of investment banking services, particularly to 
corporate clients, is on the cutting edge of the information 
revolution. Repeal of Glass-Steagall would allow banking or-
ganizations to evolve with technology and the market, and 
would provide real public benefits from increased competi-
tion and from possible economies of scale and scope. Main-
tenance of the current environment, on the other hand, will 
force us to incur unnecessary costs as the specialized re-
sources of banking organizations are transferred into other 
activities or businesses-not because of banks' unwillingness 
to compete or innovate, but simply because of an inflexible 
statutory and regulatory structure. 315 
317 
While repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, at least in the context 
of foreign branches, is a viable and enticing thought, the me-
chanics of such a repeal would be extremely complicated.316 Spe-
cifically, the parent bank would have to be insulated from the 
perceived risks resulting from the foreign branch's investment 
banking activities. Such insulation could be accomplished by re-
quiring the bank to install firewalls between the bank and its 
foreign branches.317 A firewall is essentially a restriction on activ-
ities between a bank and any related entity engaged in investment 
315 Greenspan, Innovation and Regulation of Banks in the 1990's, 74 Fed. Res. Bull. 783, 
785-86 (1988) (emphasis added); but see Cane, supra note 19, at 164 ("[i]t's ironic that all 
the trumpeting now of these [regulatory] protections stemming from 1929 is being done 
by the same sources that have been trying to get rid of them and remove all inhibitions 
on the free markets") (quoting Silk, Volker on the Crash, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1987, [Mag-
azine], at 48, col. 3). 
31G The political repercussions which would accompany the repeal of Glass-Steagall, 
however, may not be as great as previously thought. This is due in large part to a recent 
policy reversal by the Securities Industry Association (SIA). Specifically, on December I, 
1989, the SIA released a proposal for restructuring the financial services industry which 
would allow "non-federally insured units of U.S. banking organizations [referred to as 
'Investment Banking Financing Companies'] to engage in a broad range of securities and 
securities-related activities [currently prohibited by the Glass-Steagall Act] .... " Securities 
Industry Association, Media Release I (Dec. I, 1989). In return for allowing U.S. banks 
broader securities powers, the SIA proposal will allow securities firms to have "some access 
to the Federal Reserve payments system, emergency borrowing, [and] consumer banking 
rights." Id. For a more complete discussion of the SIA proposal, see SIA Offers Glass-
Steagall Compromise; BHC Group Suggests Meeting With SIA, 21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 
No. 48, at 1797 (Dec. 8, 1989). 
317 See SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, REP. ON THE FINAN-
CIAL MODERNIZATION ACT OF 1988, S. REP. No. 305, 100th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1988), reprinted 
in [1988] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) (April 6, 1988) [hereinafter Modernization Act]. 
While the Financial Modernization Act of 1988 (Modernization Act) was overwhelm-
ingly approved by the Senate, it met with substantial resistance in the House of Repre-
sentatives. See Inaction by Congress on Financial Reform Laws Is Draining Economy, Proxmire 
Warns, Ouly-Dec.]51 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 17, at 738 (Oct. 31,1988). 
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banking activities.318 The purpose of a firewall is threefold: to 
require the bank to make impartial credit decisions, to prevent 
the affiliate engaged in investment banking activities from ob-
taining a funding advantage due to the availability of deposit 
insurance to the bank's creditors, and to prevent the extension 
of deposit insurance coverage to investment banking activities.319 
The types of regulations that amount to firewalls which satisfy 
these purposes include: 
1. No extension of credit from the parent bank to the foreign 
branch for the purpose of funding the foreign branch's in-
vestment activity; 
2. No extension of credit from the parent bank to any indi-
vidual or business entity when the funds are to be used for 
repayment of interest or principal, or for paying dividends 
on any securities underwritten by that bank's foreign branch; 
3. No extension of credit from the parent bank to any indi-
vidual or business entity when the funds are to be used for 
purchasing securities underwritten by that bank's foreign 
branch; 
4. No extension of credit from the parent bank to an issuer 
of securities or any entity affiliated with the issuer when such 
securities have been or are being underwritten by the bank's 
foreign branch; 
5. The parent bank may not purchase securities in which its 
bank has acted as underwriter, either for its own account or 
as trustee, until at least 60 days have passed since the under-
writing period ended; 
6. The parent bank may not offer any investment advice or 
opinion concerning any securities underwritten by its foreign 
branch until at least 60 days have passed since the under-
writing period ended; 
7. The foreign branch must prominently display on all se-
curities transactions that such transactions are not covered 
by any United States-sponsored insurance program, includ-
ing, but not limited to, the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration and the Security Investor Protection Program; and 
8. No foreign branch shall be allowed to engage in any in-
vestment banking activity if the consolidated capital position 
of the parent bank or bank holding company is below the 
risk-based capital guidelines then in force. 32o 
318 See Modernization Act, supra note 317, at 17. 
319 See id. 
320 These firewall provisions are based upon similar provisions in the Modernization 
Act, supra note 317, at 300-02. There are, however, substantive differences in the oper-
ation of each set of firewalls. 
The Modernization Act employed the "separate-affiliate" concept wherein all permis-
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Together, the foregoing firewalls should sufficiently insulate 
the bank and foreign branch from the majority of perceived risks 
associated with investment banking activity. They may, however, 
present other problems for the bank and foreign branch. If the 
firewalls are seen as highly restrictive of activities between the 
bank and the foreign branch by the host country bank regulators, 
the foreign branch may be reclassified as a subsidiary of the bank. 
Such reclassification may subject the branch to differing regula-
tory treatment which could offset any gain associated with the 
branch's newly created investment banking abilities. Moreover, 
even if the foreign branch is not reclassified by host country 
regulators as a subsidiary, they may perceive it to be a much 
greater threat to the competitiveness of their own banks. Conse-
quently, the regulators may restrict the foreign branch's activities 
to such a point as to render its investment banking freedom moot. 
VI. ATTEMPTS TO COORDINATE INTERNATIONAL BANK 
SUPERVISION 
For many years, there existed no group charged with coordi-
nating international banking regulation, and the predictable re-
sults are, as U.S. banks' foreign branches know, banking regula-
tions among countries which are difficult, if not impossible, to 
reconcile. This situation was first addressed in 1974 when the 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS)321 appointed the Com-
sible bank securities activities would be conducted in non-FDIC insured affiliates, none 
of which would be allowed to engage in deposit-taking activities. See Isaac & Fein, supra 
note 5, at 300-02. Unlike the Modernization Act, this Article proposes to allow deposit-
taking foreign branches to engage in investment banking activities to the same extent as 
banks organized in the host country or branches in the host country which are organized 
under the laws of another country; provided, however, that these foreign branches have 
deposit insurance from the host country. 
For a discussion opposing the use of many firewalls advocated herein, see Those Nasty 
Firewalls, 8 BANKING Exp. REP. 16 (Oct. 2, 1989) (arguing that certain types of firewalls 
are inconsistent with the manner in which the banking and securities industries are 
regulated outside the United States and that such firewalls "will impair the efficient 
delivery of corporate financial services are unnecessary to maintain the safety and sound-
ness of banking organization"). 
32. The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) is located in Basel, Switzerland. It was 
formed in 1930 as an organization of central banks. The purpose of forming the BIS was 
twofold: (I) "to promote the co-operation of central banks and to provide additional 
facilities for financial operations," and (2) "to act as trustee or agent in regard to inter-
national financial settlements (i.e. World War I reparations) entrusted to it under agree-
ments with the parties concerned." See REPORT TO CONGRESS BY THE SECRETARY OF THE 
TREASURY, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, 
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mittee on Bank Regulation and Supervisory Practices (hereinafter 
Cooke Committee).322 The Cooke Committee consists of central 
bank representatives from the Group of Ten countries.323 The 
Cooke Committee's purpose is to provide a. forum where central 
AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON UNITED STATES MEMBERSHIP IN THE BANK FOR INTER-
NATIONAL SETTLEMENTS I (1984). 
The BIS currently operates as a forum where central bankers can meet and discuss 
issues of common concern and as an international financial institution. It is not, however, 
an international lender of last resort. Hackney & Shafer, The Regulation of International 
Banking: An Assessment of International Institutions, II N.C.]. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 479, 487 
(1986). 
322 The committee is referred to as the Cooke Committee because of the significant 
progress it made during the tenure of its second chairman, Peter Cooke, who was also 
head of the Bank of England. 
323 Hackney & Shafer, supra note 321, at 487. The Group ofTen consists of the United 
States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Belgium, Sweden, and Japan. Id. at 487 n.S!. The following organizations from these 















Norton, supra note 76, at 1301 n.7. 
Table D. 
Representative Organization(s) 
National Bank of Belgium 
Banking Commission 
Bank of Canada 
Office of the Inspector General of Banks 
Bank of France 
Banking Commission 
Deutsche Bundesbank 
Federal Banking Supervisory Office 
Bank of Italy 
Bank of Japan 
Ministry of Finance 
Luxembourg Monetary Institute 
The Netherlands Bank 
Sveriges Riksbank 
Royal Swedish Banking Inspectorate 
Swiss National Bank 
Swiss Federal Banking Commission 
Bank of England 
Federal Reserve Board 
Federal Reserve Bank of New Yo,rk 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Bank for International Settlements 
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bankers can meet and discuss policy issues which affect domestic 
supervision of internationallending.324 The Cooke Committee's 
first meeting in 1975 produced the seminal document which 
attempted to coordinate international banking supervisory ef-
forts-the Basle Concordat. 
A. The Basle Concordat 
The Basle Concordat (Concordat) establishes broad guidelines 
within which international supervisory authorities should func-
tion.325 The Concordat's objectives are simple and straightfor-
ward: no foreign financial institution should escape supervision, 
and whatever supervision it receives "should be adequate."326 To 
accomplish these objectives, the Concordat set forth the following 
five principles: 
(1) The supervision of foreign banking establishments should 
be the joint responsibility of host and parent authorities; 
The Cooke Committee was formed largely as a response to the 1974 failure of West 
Germany's largest private bank, l.D. Herstatt, as well as the failure of two state banks, 
Hessische Landesbank Girozentrale and Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale. All three 
failures were primarily caused by the banks' international operations. See J. BAKER, IN-
TERNATIONAL BANK REGULATION 15 (1978); Norton, supra note 76, at 1336. 
324 Friesen, The Regulation and Supervision of International Lending (Pt. 2), 20 INT'L LAW. 
153,205 (1986). Specifically, the Cooke Committee has three objectives: (I) to provide a 
forum where central bankers can meet and develop closer communication leading to 
mutual cooperation; (2) to formulate consistent guidelines for supervising banks' foreign 
offices/activities; and (3) to objectively examine risks arising from international banking. 
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION OF BANK SUPERVISION: THE 
RECORD TO DATE 2, 15 (1986). In accomplishing the foregoing objectives, the Cooke 
Committee's approach has been characterized in the following manner: 
The committee does not undertake a formal supernational supervisory role; its 
conclusions do not have, and were never intended to have, legal force. Rather, 
it formulates and recommends broad supervisory principles and guidelines of 
the best practices in the hope and expectation that individual authorities will 
take steps to implement them through detailed arrangements-statutory or oth-
erwise-which are best suited to their own national systems. In this way the 
committee encourages some gradual convergence towards a common approach 
and common standards without attempting far reaching harmonization of mem-
bers countries [sic] supervisory techniques. 
Norton, supra note 76, at 1337 (quoting W. COOKE, BASEL SUPERVISORS COMMITTEE 
[1984]). 
325 Hackney & Shafer, supra note 321, at 489. 
326Id. 
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(2) No foreign banking institution should escape supervision, 
each country should ensure that foreign banking establish-
ments are supervised, and supervision should be adequate as 
judged by both the host and parent authorities; 
(3) The supervision of liquidity should be the primary re-
sponsibility of host authorities since foreign establishments 
generally have to conform to local practices for their liquidity 
management and must comply with local regulations; 
(4) The supervision of solvency of foreign branches should 
be essentially a matter for the parent authority. In the case 
of subsidiaries, while primary responsibility lies with the host 
authority, parent authorities should take account of the ex-
posure of their domestic banks' moral commitment in this 
regard; and 
(5) Practical cooperation would be facilitated by transfers of 
information between host and parent authorities and by 
granting of permission for inspections by or on behalf of 
parent authorities on the territory of the host authority. Every 
effort should be made to remove any legal restraints (partic-
ularly in the field of professional secrecy or national sover-
eignty) which might hinder these forms of cooperation.327 
The Concordat represents a crucial step toward the coordina-
tion of international banking supervision. Soon after its release, 
however, several of the Concordat's shortcomings became readily 
apparent. For instance, the Concordat's proposal that host au-
thorities should have primary responsibility for regulating a for-
eign subsidiary'S solvency conflicted with a 1978 recommendation 
by the Group of Ten that supervision of international banking 
institutions should be performed on a consolidated basis.328 Fur-
thermore, the Concordat failed to address problems posed by 
each country's differing level of supervisory standards as well as 
to define what constituted "adequate" supervision.329 Conse-
quently, the Cooke Committee met in 1983 to revise the original 
Concordat. 
B. The Revised Concordat 
The revised Concordat attempts to address problems inherent 
in the original Concordat without contradicting the original doc-
327 Cooke, Evolving Techniques for Cooperation Among Supervisory Authorities, 3 J. COMPo L. 
& SEC. REG. 46, 48 (1981). 
328 R. DALE, supra note 14, at 173. 
329 [d. 
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ument's guidelines and principles.330 In so doing, the revised 
Concordat differs from the original Concordat in three ways: 
First, [the revised Concordat] incorporates the principles of 
consolidated supervision. Supervisors cannot be assured of 
an individual bank's soundness without knowing that the 
banking group, comprised of the parent, branches, and sub-
sidiaries, has not assumed total commitments and risks that 
are disproportionate to the group's capital base. The consol-
idated supervision proposed in the revised Concordat applies 
to country risk exposure as well as capital adequacy. Second, 
[because] supervisory gaps have resulted from inadequate 
supervisory standards in certain countries ... [t]he revised 
Concordat clarifies that host-country and parent-country cen-
tral banks jointly share responsibility for supervising 
branches and subsidiaries with respect to liquidity; however, 
regarding solvency, parent central banks supervise, while 
joint parent-host supervision is required for subsidiaries. 
Third, the revised Concordat explicitly states what was im-
plicit earlier: the central banks will not necessarily act as 
lenders of last resort.331 
Clearly, the revised Concordat improved and strengthened the 
original agreement by delineating the parent country and host 
country supervisory responsibilities. It did not, however, establish 
any standardized bases from which to regulate international 
banking. The necessity of such a standard and concern about 
declining levels of capital in international banks led the Cooke 
Committee in 1987 to announce an agreement by central bank 
governors from twelve industrialized nations proposing an inter-
national risk-based capital system of banking regulation.332 
C. Risk-Based Capital Proposal 
The risk-based capital proposal is designed to accomplish two 
objectives the Cooke Committee believes are of the utmost im-
portance in order to stabilize global financial markets.333 First, 
the proposal seeks to strengthen the financial position of inter-
national banks by requiring them to maintain higher levels of 
SSO Note, The Proposed Risk-Based Capital Framework: A Model of International Banking 
Cooperation?, II FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 777, 781-82 n.31 (1988). 
m Hackney & Shafer, supra note 321, at 489-90. 
SS2 Note, supra note 330, at 777-78. The twelve industrialized nations include the Group 
of Ten Nations, Switzerland, and Luxembourg. Id.; see supra note 323 for a list of the 
Group of Ten Nations. 
ssg See Note, supra note 330, at 783. 
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capital.334 Second, the proposal attempts to put international 
banks in pari pasu by removing existing differences in various 
national regulatory schemes.335 In so doing, the proposal contains 
a uniform definition of capital, a risk-based capital ratio, and a 
common minimum capital adequacy ratio.336 
1. Uniform Definition of Capital 
Currently, there is no consensus among nations as to what 
constitutes capital.337 The proposal corrects this situation by es-
tablishing a uniform definition of capital called adjusted primary 
capital.338 Adjusted primary capital is determined by utilizing four 
factors which comprise a bank's capital base: tier 1 capital, tier 2 
capital, goodwill, and investments in other financial institutions. 339 
The following equation illustrates how adjusted primary capital 
would be computed: 
Table IV. 
Adjusted Primary Capital = 
[(Tier 1 Capital - Goodwill) + Tier 2 Capital] 
- Investing In Other Businesses 
2. Risk-Based Capital Ratio 
The risk-based capital ratio measures a bank's risk-weighted 
asset base in relation to its adjusted primary capitaJ.340 The pur-
pose of this ratio is to quantify various on- and off-balance sheet 




337 See supra notes 36, 128, 196,259 and accompanying text. 
338 Note, supra note 330, at 784. 
339 [d. at 784-85. Tier I, or core capital, is composed of equity capital and reserves 
computed from after-tax retained earnings. Tier 1 capital must represent at least 50% of 
a bank's adjusted primary capital. 
Tier 2, or supplementary capital, consists of hidden reserves created by revaluing assets, 
general loan loss reserves, hybrid debt/equity instruments, and subordinated debt instru-
ments. Certain components of Tier 2 capital may not receive full value in computations 
for adjusted primary capital. 
Goodwill is an intangible asset which is generally created when an asset is purchased at 
a price exceeding its book value. Outside of certain tax consequences and justifying an 
asset's purchase price on a balance sheet, goodwill is of little practical value to a company. 
For an in-depth discussion of adjusted primary capital and its components, see id. at 784-
85 nn.53-56. 
340 [d. at 784. 
341 [d. at 785-86. 
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puting the risk-based capital ratio is a complex process but essen-
tially involves three steps. First, a risk-weighted asset figure is 
computed by multiplying both on- and off-balance sheet items by 
a risk-adjusting factor. 342 Next, the sum of these risk-weighted 
assets is adjusted upward for loan and lease loss allowances.343 
This sum is called a bank's risk-weighted asset base.344 Finally, 
the risk-weighted asset base is divided into adjusted primary cap-
ital, and the resulting figure is the bank's risk-based capital 
ratio.345 
3. Common Minimum Capital Adequate Requirement 
The third prong of the proposal is a common minimum capital 
adequacy requirement. Capital adequacy is a minimum amount 
of capital expressed as a percentage of assets which a bank must 
maintain to protect it against unforeseen losses.346 The Cooke 
Committee has determined that by 1992, banks must have a 
342Id. at 785. A bank's on-balance sheet items are its assets (including loans, securities, 
etc.). A bank's off-balance sheet items may include guarantees, floating rate notes, letters 
of credit, and swaps (both interest rate and currency). A bank's off-balance sheet items 
are included in its capital adequacy computation because these items expose the bank to 
tremendous credit and interest rate risk. Id. 
343Id. at 786-87. The weighting multiples are based on the perceived risk inherent in 
each item. The higher the perceived risk of an item, the higher a multiple it receives. 
This results in the bank having to maintain a proportionately higher level of capital for 
higher risk items. For instance, cash balances are considered a no-risk item and, accord-
ingly, are afforded a 0% multiple. Conversely, private sector loans are considered a high 
risk item and receive a 100% multiple. Id. at 788 n.75. 
344Id. 
345 The proposal gives supervisory authorities the latitude to adjust a bank's risk 
weighted asset base if, in their professional opinion, the bank's capital adequacy is signif-
icantly different from what the risk-based capital ratio shows. See id. 
346Id. at 786-88. Obviously, this is a gross oversimplification of an exceedingly complex 
process. The calculation of the risk-based capital ratio is succinctly described as follows: 
Off-balance sheet items are weighted according to risks through a two-step 
process. First, they are converted into credit risk equivalents by multiplying 
principal amount by a credit-risk conversion factor. Off-balance sheet instru-
ments are divided into five broad categories according to credit risk. The category 
determines which credit-risk conversion factor is to be applied. Second, the on-
balance sheet credit-risk equivalents are assigned a risk-weight also according to 
the degree of credit risk to the obligor. The proposal establishes five broad 
categories of risk weights: 0%, 10%,20%,50%, and 100%. The greater the risk 
of the asset, the higher the risk weight assigned. On-balance sheet items go 
through a one-step process that is identical to the second step of the off-balance 
sheet process ... [the sum of the risk-adjusted on-balance and off-balance sheet 
items of the weighted risk-asset base.] The result of dividing adjusted primary 
capital (the numerator) by the weighted risk-asset base (the denominator) is the 
so-called risk-based capital ratio .... 
Id. at 786-89. 
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minimum capital adequacy of 8%, as calculated by the previously 
discussed risk-based capital ratio.347 Regulators worldwide are 
currently adopting the proposal with little or no change to its 
structure.348 
D. The Second Banking Directive 
The most recent legislative attempt to coordinate international 
banking occurred on December 15, 1989, when the European 
Community's (Community) finance ministers approved the Sec-
ond Banking Directive.349 The directive establishes criteria by 
which a member state can authorize a bank's establishment within 
its borders.35o Once a bank has received such home country au-
thorization, it can establish additional operations in any member 
state without having to submit to further registration proce-
dures.351 Significantly, the types of operations the bank may es-
347Id. at 789. 
348 The phrase "with little or no change to its structure" is meant to indicate that each 
country's bank regulators must tailor the risk-based capital guidelines to the nuances 
inherent in that country's financial structure. For instance, certain intangible assets, such 
as purchased mortgage servicing rights, are a popular bank asset in this country but do 
not exist in other countries. Consequently, U.S. regulators are given discretion in custom-
izing this country's risk-based capital guidelines to account for this type of difference. See 
Norton, supra note 76, at 1346-47. 
For an explanation of the final risk-based capital guidelines in the United States, see 
Risk-Based Capital Guidelines, 54 Fed. Reg. 4168 (1989) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. Part 
3), Capital; Risk-Based Capital Guidelines, 4186 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. Parts 208 and 
225), Capital Maintenance; Final Statement of Policy on Risk-Based Capital, 11500 (to be 
codified at 12 C.F.R. Part 325). 
349 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 386) 1 (1989). The European Community (Community) 
legislates policy changes in two ways-regulations and directives. The distinction between 
the two methods is as follows: 
A regulation is binding in its entirety and is directly applicable throughout the 
Community without any implementing legislation by the member states. By 
contrast, a directive is addressed to member states, which are obligated to ensure 
that the result set forth in the directive is achieved but have some discretion as 
to the details of its implementation. 
Most of the EC internal market legislation is in the form of directives. Each 
directive specifies a date by which the member states must conform their national 
laws to the provisions of the directive; typically the states have two years to do 
so. Therefore, to complete the internal market by the end of 1992, directives 
would need to be enacted by the end of 1990. 
Key, Mutual Recognition: Integration of the Financial Sector in the European Community, 75 
Fed. Res. Bull. 591, 594 (1989) (emphasis in original). 
350 Council of Ministers Approves Single Banking License, Minimum Solvency Ratios, 53 Bank-
ing Report (BNA) No. 25, at 994 (Dec. 25, 1989). 
mId. The Directive provides that banks chartered in countries which are not members 
of the Community shall be treated as Community banks if they are authorized to conduct 
business in a Community country prior to January 1, 1993. After that date, home country 
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tablish in other member states is controlled by the laws of the 
country which granted home country authorization rather than 
the state into which expansion is sought.352 Thus, once the direc-
tive is implemented, banks which currently engage in investment 
banking activities only in the United Kingdom or West Germany 
may engage in these activities throughout the Community. This 
expansion of investment banking activities will adversely affect 
U.S. banks' foreign branches in two ways. 
Initially, as British and West German banks engage in poten-
tially lucrative investment banking activities across Europe, their 
ties to the industrial sector will become stronger as will their fiscal 
position. Meanwhile, unless the previously discussed amendments 
to the Glass-Steagall Act are adopted, U.S. banks' foreign 
branches will be unable to participate in these newly-opened mar-
kets, and they will become even less competitive in European 
financial markets. 
authorization for a non-Community country bank will be conditioned upon the country 
in which such bank is chartered meeting certain reciprocity provisions. Id. 
352 Statement by Manuel H. Johnson, Vice Chairman of the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions Supervision, 
Regulation and Insurance of the Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 
U.S. House of Representatives (September 26, 1989), reprinted in 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 744, 
745 (1989) [hereinafter Statement by M. Johnson]. 
The list of activities subject to mutual recognition by Community countries, however, 
is limited by the terms of the directive to the following activities: 
1. Acceptance of deposits and other repayable funds from the public. 
2. Lending (including consumer credit, mortgage credit, factoring, with or 
without recourse, and financing of commercial transactions). 
3. Financial Leasing. 
4. Money transmission services. 
5. Issuing and administering means of payment (e.g., credit cards, travellers' 
cheques and bankers' drafts). 
6. Guarantees and commitments. 
7. Trading for own account or for account of customers in: 
(a) money market instruments (cheques, bills, CD's, etc.); 
(b) foreign exchange; 
(c) financial futures and options; 
(d) exchange and interest rate instruments; 
(e) transferable securities. 
8. Participation in share issues and the provision of services related to such 
issues. 
9. Advice to undertakings on capital structure, industrial strategy and related 
questions and advice and services relating to mergers and the purchase of un-
dertakings. 
10. Money broking. 
11. Portfolio management and advice. 
12. Safekeeping and administration of securities. 
13. Credit reference services. 
14 . Safe custody services. 
Annex to the Second Banking Directive, 30 OJ. Eur. Comm. (No. L 386) I, 13 (1989). 
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This competitive disadvantage will then increase as member 
states begin to align their banking laws. This process, known as 
regulatory convergence, will occur in member states whose cur-
rent banking laws are more restrictive than either the United 
Kingdom's or West Germany's.353 As these countries realize that 
the directive has placed their banks at a disadvantage in relation 
to British or West German banks, legislators in these countries 
will quickly take steps to liberalize their banking laws so that such 
laws more closely resemble those of the United Kingdom and 
West Germany. The net result of these actions will be increased 
investment banking activities for banks chartered in member 
states and a further weakening of U.S. banking presence in 
Europe. 
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE-INTERNATIONAL 
REGULATION OF FOREIGN BRANCHES 
The Cooke Committee's risk based capital proposal represents 
the most significant step ever taken toward coordinating the reg-
ulation of international banking on a world-wide basis. Before 
the end of 1992, there will exist a common denominator in the 
measurement of banks' fiscal strength in the Group of Ten na-
tions, as well as in Luxembourg and Switzerland, because banks 
in each country will be subject to relatively uniform capital guide-
lines. By contrast, the Community's Second Banking Directive 
only attempts to coordinate the regulation of international bank-
ing within Community banking markets. While the directive may 
ultimately result in uniform banking activities throughout the 
world, its immediate effect will be to put U.S. banks' foreign 
branches at a competitive disadvantage when compared to many 
of their counterparts in the Community. Specifically, the directive 
will allow British and West German banks to offer investment 
banking activities throughout the Community while U.S. banks' 
foreign branches will continue to be hamstrung by the Glass-
Steagall Act which forbids them from underwriting, distributing, 
or selling securities. As previously discussed, this disparity in 
permissible banking activities cannot be allowed to exist, and the 
Glass-Steagall Act must be repealed to the extent it applies to 
U.S. banks' foreign branches. 
m See Statement by M. Johnson, supra note 352, at 747. 
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In addition, numerous other areas of international banking 
regulation remain in a state of disarray which negatively affects 
the competitiveness of U.S. banks' foreign branches. Several steps 
must be taken to remedy this situation. 
A. Liquidity Control 
First, several of the provisions contained in the Concordat and 
the revised Concordat should be codified by each country and be 
enforced by that country's bank regulators. Specifically, because 
a foreign branch's liquidity is necessarily a local concern affected 
by local events, supervision of foreign branch liquidity should be 
performed by regulators in the host country. Once host countries 
assume supervision of liquidity, it will be unnecessary to subject 
U.S. banks' foreign branches to U.S. reserve requirements. 354 The 
removal of reserve requirements will immediately lower a U.S. 
bank's foreign branches' operating costs because it will enable 
such branch to convert a greater percentage of its deposits into 
interest earning assets rather than requiring them to sit idle. This 
will allow the U.S. bank's foreign branches to compete more 
effectively against host country banks which are not subject to 
U.S. reserve requirements. Of course, whether this would lower 
effective reserve requirements in such a manner as to create 
competitive inequality among the U.S. bank holding companies 
should first be examined. Similarly, because reserve requirements 
are a means by which the Board of Governors of the FRS imple-
ments monetary policy, potential macroeconomic effects should 
also be considered. 
B. Examination 
Furthermore, as the Basle Concordat and the revised Concor-
dat stress, the supervision of a foreign branch's solvency should 
be performed on a consolidated basis by regulators in the bank's 
parent country. Because the bank's head office and the majority 
of its corporate records are generally located in the parent coun-
try, that country's regulators have easier access to all pertinent 
records concerning the bank's worldwide activities. Because one 
regulatory authority can scrutinize all transactions, a higher level 
of regulatory confidence should exist concerning a bank's true 
354 See supra notes 83-93 and accompanying text (discussion of reserve requirements). 
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financial position. There must be open lines of communication 
between regulators in the parent country and the host country 
concerning not only the individual banks and branches, but also 
events within each country which may affect financial markets in 
general.355 Given the recent events concerning uniform capital 
adequacy guidelines, such open communication among bank reg-
ulators may become a reality in the next few years. 
C. Foreign Branch Lending 
Nevertheless, numerous regulatory areas exist which the Basle 
Concordat and the revised Concordat do not directly address. 
Specifically, a foreign branch's lending activities should be super-
vised by regulators in the parent country. The rationale support-
ing this position is simple. As previously mentioned, regulators 
in the parent country would already have responsibility for su-
pervising a foreign branch's solvency. Solvency is directly related 
to lending activities in which a financial institution engages. Ac-
cordingly, in order to meaningfully regulate solvency, it is imper-
ative that the parent country also regulate lending activities. Al-
though lending limits will vary among banks and foreign 
branches in a particular country, the effect this variance will have 
on competition will be minimal in relation to the benefits which 
accrue by allowing the parent country to regulate both solvency 
and lending activities on a consolidated basis. Ideally, capital ad-
equacy, solvency, and lending activities will each be uniform 
among nations. 
D. Foreign Exchange Control 
Unlike lending activities, the foreign exchange actIvItIes in 
which a foreign branch is allowed to engage should be regulated 
by the branch's host country. As with liquidity controls, foreign 
exchange activities are determined by forces which are local in 
nature, especially a host country's monetary policy. Consequently, 
the host country's regulators are in a much better position to 
355 The impact of communication among bank regulators concerning bank solvency can 
have far-reaching effects. Complete candor among bank regulators can eventually lead 
to a more harmonized country risk evaluation system for international lending. Further-
more, this communication may eventually lead to better coordinated disclosure require-
ments enabling banks and foreign branches to generate one set of reports which satisfy 
multiple regulatory authorities. 
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analyze and regulate foreign exchange activities not only because 
of their familiarity with their country's economic policies and 
forces, but also because of their proximity to where the activities 
occur. 
E. Deposit Insurance 
Finally, deposit insurance should also be the responsibility of 
the foreign branch's host country. By requiring host country 
deposit insurance (to the extent it exists in the host country), no 
deposit will be uninsured and each country's deposit insurance 
scheme can statistically account for the perceived risk of the 
activities allowed in its banking system. For instance, deposits at 
U.S. banks' foreign branches located in Japan are currently not 
covered by the FDIC or the Japanese Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration. Requiring host country deposit insurance will rectify this 
situation and place U.S. banks' foreign branches on more equal 
footing, both in the eyes of Japanese depositors and in the cost 
of its deposit insurance. Once this step is taken, however, U.S. 
regulators must make it clear that deposits at banks or foreign 
branches not located in the United States will not receive U.S. 
insurance coverage in the event of bank failure. 356 
CONCLUSION 
Many changes must be made before the regulation of U.S. 
banks' foreign branches is coordinated and equalized with those 
of their host country competitors. The majority of these changes 
are beyond the exclusive control of the United States and its 
regulators. While changes in regulatory areas such as lending 
limits, liquidity, reserve requirements, and deposit insurance 
would be beneficial to the competitiveness of U.S. banks' foreign 
branches, such changes would be most effective if they were 
coordinated with foreign banking authorities. The Glass-Steagall 
Act, the major competitive barrier to U.S. banks' foreign 
branches, is, however, within the exclusive province of the U.S. 
regulatory process. 
We recommend dismantling the Glass-Steagall Act in the con-
text of foreign branches' securities activities provided that certain 
356 See supra note 97 (discussing the insurance coverage extended to "non-insured" 
foreign deposits in the Continental Illinois National Bank failure). 
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firewalls are installed and maintained. Such a recommendation 
is prudent not only because it would allow U.S. banks to compete 
on equal terms overseas, but it is also congruent with current 
regulatory posture concerning the securities activities of banks 
and bank holding companies. 
Specifically, on January 18, 1989, the Board of Governors of 
the FRS conditionally approved the applications of five U .S.-
based multinational bank holding companies to allow their affil-
iates (but not the banks or their branches) to engage in limited 
underwriting of debt and equity securities.357 This approval seems 
to domesticate the FRB's policy of allowing foreign subsidiaries 
of U.S. banks and bank holding companies to engage in securities 
activities overseas. 358 Moreover, it fortifies an already clear trend 
toward greatly expanded bank securities activities. With certain 
firewalls in place, allowing foreign branches to underwrite debt 
and equity securities is the logical, and required, next step. 
Nevertheless, critics will downplay the effectiveness of the rec-
ommended firewalls and will cite increased vulnerability of the 
federal deposit insurance fund as a rationale for not allowing 
foreign branches to engage in these securities activities. 359 This 
rationale, however, is flawed in the international context. First, 
deposits of a U.S. bank's foreign branch are excluded from cal-
culations used to determine the bank's deposit insurance pre-
mium.360 Therefore, such deposits are not insured by the FDIC 
and are unprotected in the event the foreign branch fails. 361 
Accordingly, foreign branch securities activities should not expose 
our federal insurance deposit fund to any additional risks. Sec-
ond, foreign branch deposits should be covered by the host coun-
try's deposit insurance system as suggested by the Basle Concor-
dat. 362 The deposit insurance systems in foreign countries already 
357 January 18th Approval, supra note 22. 
358 See 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(d)(3) (1989) (subsidiaries of a bank holding company may 
engage in the "underwriting, distributing, and dealing in debt and equity securities outside 
the United States .... "); see supra note 71 (discussing the application of this provision). 
359 See, e.g., GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BANK POWERS: INSULATING BANKS FROM THE 
POTENTIAL RISKS OF EXPANDED ACTIVITIES (1987). As one commentator has noted, the 
primary concern of this study "was the potential for increased risks to the federal deposit 
insurance fund through expanded non-traditional banking activities by FDIC-insured 
banks." Cane, supra note 19, at 170 (emphasis added). . 
360 12 U.S.C.A. § 1817(b)(5) (West 1989). 
361 12 U.S.C.A. § 1813(m)(l) (West 1989). 
362 See supra note 345 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of host country 
deposit insurance). 
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presumably take into account the risks of underwriting securities 
as these activities are being undertaken by their domestic banks. 
If deposits of V.S. banks' foreign branches were routinely insured 
by the host country, this would also mean that the FDIC would 
be more effectively insulated from claims arising from foreign 
branch failure. Although the FDIC is not required to cover for-
eign deposits, it has done so in the past without receiving insur-
ance premiums.363 This ad hoc approach would no longer be 
necessary. 
V.S. legislators must take the initiative and repeal the Glass-
Steagall Act, at least in the context of foreign branch investment 
banking activity. Only simultaneous repeal of the Glass-Steagall 
Act and multilateral coordination of banking regulation would 
allow the V nited States to regain its preeminence in the inter-
national banking arena. 
363 See Sprague, supra note 97, at 144-46 (discussing payment to foreign depositors in 
conjunction with the Continental Illinois National Bank failure). 
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United States banks enter 
Japan primarily through 
branches. Potential entrants 
must apply to the Ministry of 
Finance (MOF) for a banking 
license. Criteria the MOF 
considers for granting such 
licenses include: financial 
resources, banking expertise, 
proposed business plan, 
economic need, and 
reciprocity. 
Entrants must notify the Bank 
of England (BOE) two months 
before branch operations are 
to begin. Entrants are 
generally not required to meet 
individual capital adequacy 
requirements, but the BOE 
will view a consolidated 
assessment of the bank's 
financial soundness and 
management capability made 
by the bank's primary 
supervisory authority. 
Entrants must apply to the 
Federal Banking Supervisory 
Office (FBSO) for banking 
licenses. Statutory criteria for 
the granting of such licenses 
include: initial minimum 
capital of DM6,000,000, 
operation of the branch by 
two experienced managers, 
and submission of a detailed 
business plan. The FBSO may 
require membership in the 
Deposit Protection Fund 
before granting the license. 
Capital Adequacy 
No statutory criteria exist for 
capital adequacy. However, the 
MOF suggests that: (I) 
shareholder equity, loan loss 
reserves, reserves for return 
allowances, and special 
reserves should equal 10% of 
demand deposits; (2) total 
loans should not exceed 80% 
of deposits; and (3) the bank's 
operational fixed assets should 
not exceed 50% of net worth. 
No statutory criteria exist for 
capital adequacy. However, the 
BOE utilizes two ratios, the 
gearing ratio and the risk asset 
ratio, to analyze a bank's 
capital position in light of 
circumstances unique to that 
institution. 
No statutory criteria exist for 
capital adequacy. However, 
Principle I of the FBSO 
regulations provides that loans 
and equity participations, 
exclusive of loan loss 
provisions, may not exceed 
eighteen times a bank's capital. 
The loans and equity 
participations are risk-
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Regulatory Areas by Country (Cont'd.) 
Liquidity Control 
No statutory criteria exist for 
determining a bank's liquidity. 
However, the MOF suggests 
that a bank's liquid assets 
should not exceed 30% of its 
demand deposits and 
negotiable certificates of 
deposit. Additional regulations 
exist concerning the funding 
of Eurocurrency loans. 
No statutory criteria exist for 
determining a bank's liquidity. 
However, the BOE analyzes a 
bank's liquidity by inserting 
the bank's assets and liabilities 
into a maturity ladder. Foreign 
branch liquidity is considered 
individually, with particular 
emphasis placed on liquidity in 
British pounds. 
No statutory criteria exist for 
determining a bank's liquidity. 
FBSO regulations in the form 
of Principles II and III 
establish complex ratios for 
matching assets and liabilities 
based upon their respective 
maturities. 
Lending Activities 
The Japanese Banking Law 
prohibits a bank from lending 
to a single borrower an 
amount exceeding its total 
capital and reserves. An MOF 
administrative order further 
restricts a bank's lending to a 
single borrower to 20% of its 
capital and reserves. Foreign 
branch lending limits are 
calculated with respect to the 
parent bank's capital and 
surplus. 
No statutory criteria exist for 
determining a bank's lending 
limits. The BOE suggests that 
a bank's total exposure to one 
borrower not exceed 10% of 
its capital base. 
The German Banking Act 
establishes specific criteria 
concerning a bank's lending 
activities. Large loans are 
defined as loans which exceed 
15% of the bank's equity 
capital. With respect to such 
loans, no single large loan may 
exceed 50% of a bank's equity 
capital, and the sum of all 
large loans may not exceed 
eight times a bank's equity 
capital. In addition, loans to 
insiders are subject to detailed 
rules contained in the German 
Banking Act. 





Regulatory Areas by Country (Cont'd.) 
Foreign Exchange Risk 
No statutory criteria exist for a 
bank's foreign exchange 
activities. However, the MOF 
has suggested certain 
guidelines for banks to follow. 
Such suggestions do not apply 
to foreign branches. 
No statutory criteria exist for a 
bank's foreign exchange 
activities. However, the BOE 
has suggested certain 
guidelines for banks to follow. 
Such guidelines do not apply 
to foreign branches if 
monitoring arrangements used 
by the parent bank's 
supervisory authority are 
deemed adequate. 
No statutory criteria exist for a 
bank's foreign exchange 
activities. However, the FBSO 
has created regulations in the 
form of Principle I(a) 




The Japanese Banking Law 
allows commercial banks to 
underwrite and offer 
government bonds and 
government guaranteed 
debentures. The MOF allows 
banks to engage in certain real 
estate activities, leasing 
activities, and bank equipment 
maintenance activities. 
Additionally, banks may own 
stock in companies to which 
the bank is a creditor. 
No formal restrictions placed 
on banking activities, but the 
BOE prefers non-banking 
investments to be financial in 
nature. 
No formal restrictions. Banks 
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Regulatory Areas by Country (Cont'd.) 
Bank Examination and 
Disclosure Requirements 
The MOF and the Bank of 
Japan (BOJ) conduct periodic 
on-site inspections. The 
Japanese Banking Law 
requires interim and final 
business reports for each 
business year, and it also 
requires banks to make public 
a balance sheet, income 
statement, and explanatory 
documents within three 
months after the end of each 
business year. 
The BOE does not generally 
conduct on-site examinations 
and, instead, relies on 
statistical data gathered 
monthly at regular meetings 
with the banks' senior 
management. The Companies 
Act requires banks to annually 
prepare a. consolidated balance 
sheet and income statement; 
the Banking Act requires 
those statements to be 
available for inspection at each 
deposit-taking office the bank 
maintains. 
The German Banking Act 
permits the FBSO to conduct 
on-site inspections. However, 
the FBSO generally appoints 
outside auditors to conduct 
these inspections. Banks must 
annually prepare a 
preliminary and final balance 
sheet and income statement, 
each of which is filed with the 
FBSO and the Bundesbank. 
Liquidity Support 
Banks may borrow on a short 
term basis from the BOJ at 
the bank rate. Quotas are 
established based on a 
percentage of a bank's yen 
assets. Foreign branches have 
higher percentage quotas than 
Japanese banks. 
The BOE regularly provides 
short term and sometimes 
provides long-term liquidity 
assistance to British banks. 
Foreign branches may not 
borrow from the BOE. 
Banks and foreign branches 
may rediscount eligible 
instruments with the 
Bundesbank. Each institution 
is prescribed a quota. Once 
the quota is reached, any 
further borrowing must be 
done through the Liko bank. 





Regulatory Areas by Country (Cont'd.) 
Deposit Insurance 
All deposits at Japanese banks (except interbank deposits) are 
covered up to three million yen per account by the Deposit 
Insurance Corporation. Deposits at foreign branches are not 
eligible for coverage. 
Seventy-five percent of a deposit at banks and foreign branches up 
to a maximum of 20,000 pounds is covered by the statutorily 
created Deposit Protection Fund. 
The Federal Association of German Banks created the Deposit 
Guarantee Fund, which protects a portion of depositors' funds, 
based upon the bank's equity capital. The FBSO generally requires 
foreign branches to become members of the Deposit Guarantee 
Fund as a precondition to receiving a banking license. 
